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Abstract The Constitution of Cyprus (1960) is described in the report as unique
and as a hybrid model. On the one hand, it has been seen as one of the world’s most
rigid and detailed constitutions; on the other hand, some parts are governed by the
doctrine of necessity, given the division of the country. Special features include a
strong protection of social rights and of the right to property; the protection granted
to these and some other rights goes beyond the protection afforded by the ECHR.
Cyprus has a mixed model of constitutional review. Fundamental rights based
review is strong, with provisions interpreted in favour of the individual in cases of
doubt. Resorting to constitutional amendments has become a tool for addressing
issues related with the idiosyncrasies of the Cypriot Constitution. The use of this
approach has become more frequent in the last two decades, whereas there had been
a persistent refusal to amend the Constitution in the previous years. With regard to
EU law, the Constitution has been amended to remove conflicts, including by virtue
of Art. 1A, modelled loosely on the blanket EU clause of the Irish Constitution. At
times, the amendments have even proved to be excessive, e.g. as regards an
amendment pertaining to the EU Data Retention Directive that was subsequently
annulled. The Constitution has also been amended to remove barriers to the
European Arrest Warrant, alas in an incomplete way, at least initially; in parallel,
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the initially rights-protective approach of Cypriot courts has gradually been watered
down. The cases regarding EU sugar stocks measures raised issues regarding the
principles of legitimate expectations and non-retroactivity of charges. The report
raises the issue of a lack of debate about constitutional limits to EU law. It high-
lights the merits of a dissenting judicial opinion in the so-called ‘bail-in’ case that
cautioned against elimination of the rule of law and judicial protection.
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and international co-operation  The Supreme Court of Cyprus  The ‘necessity’
doctrine  Judicial review  Fundamental rights and the rule of law
Data Retention Directive and excessive constitutional amendment
European Arrest Warrant  Defence rights  Judicial review and the statute of
limitations  Property rights  Judicial dialogues and absence of constitutional limits
Supremacy  ‘Bail-in’ case  Sugar stocks cases and the principles of legitimate
expectations and non-retroactivity of charges  International extradition treaties
1 Constitutional Amendments Regarding EU Membership
1.1 Constitutional Culture
1.1.1 The Cypriot constitutional paradigm is unique in content and atypical in
character, and it can be argued that as such it has no comparative parallel at the
international level. That is manifested in two main ways.
First, there is the peculiarity of the constitutional setting whereby there is a stark
and material difference between the provisions of the Constitution of 1960 and their
actual application since 1964, when the doctrine of necessity was introduced by the
Supreme Court in the landmark judgment Ibrahim.1 The doctrine of necessity has
redeﬁned constitutional law and created two parallel constitutional worlds. On the
one hand, there are the constitutional provisions that remain in full formal force;
they provide for a bi-communal structure that assumes the presence and partici-
pation of both Turkish and Greek Cypriots and for a constitutional system with
organs of the state that are reflective of bi-communalism and with a plethora of
strict checks and balances on the same basis. This can be called ‘the silent
Constitution’. On the other hand, there is the ad hoc suspension of the invalidity
rule that attributes hierarchical supremacy to the Constitution of 1960 in those
instances that can be justiﬁed under the doctrine of necessity. This can be called
‘the pragmatic Constitution’.
Therefore, the primary peculiarity of the Cypriot constitutional system is that
both ‘Constitutions’ coexist to the point where a constitutional provision and
1 The Attorney General of the Republic v. Mustafa Ibrahim [1964] CLR 195. For analysis see
Kombos 2015a, b; Polyviou 2013, pp. 26–64; Polyviou 2015a, pp. 32–124; 2015b.
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constitutional reality are two completely different things. For example, Art. 1 pro-
vides for a Turkish-Cypriot Vice-President, but no such ofﬁcial has assumed duties
since 1963. Moreover, the Constitution in Art. 133(1) provides for a Supreme
Constitutional Court composed of three members (a Turkish-Cypriot, a
Greek-Cypriot and a presiding non-Cypriot). Since 1964, there is instead a Supreme
Court that was founded on the basis of Law 33/64, which included provisions that
were in direct contradiction with Art. 133. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court con-
tinues to function regardless of the rule in Art. 179 of the Constitution that attributes
hierarchical supremacy to the constitutional provisions.
At this point, it is useful to elaborate on the doctrine of necessity, which was
introduced on the basis of the founding premise that the Constitution exists for the
state and when the state is in grave danger of collapse, constitutional provisions
have to give way. In response to this dilemma, the Supreme Court enabled the
suspension of the application of certain fundamental constitutional provisions yet
without in any way altering any of those provisions in the formal sense. The
doctrine of necessity is an atypical response to an atypical constitutional situation
and is now in its ﬁfth decade in Cyprus.2 Therefore, the constitutional provisions
remain fully effective in theory but where the doctrine of necessity is applied, their
content and effectiveness is numbed, neutralised and non-applicable. The preceding
approach can be explained by reference to the German theoretical perception that
distinguishes between the concept of hierarchical supremacy leading to invalidity
(Geltungsvorrang) and the concept of priority in application (Anwendungsvorrang).
Where the doctrine of necessity applies, the constitutional norm is rendered
non-applicable in an exceptional and extraordinary manner, thus removing the
invalidity (Geltungsvorrang) function and, as a corollary, the contested legal norm
acquires a de facto priority in application (Anwendungsvorrang).3
Therefore, the classic perception that emphasises the distinction between
‘Constitution’ and ‘constitutional law’ is especially relevant to the Cypriot context,
given the fact that the Constitution of 1960 must be read in the light of the doctrine of
necessity that, since 1964, offers the pillar on which the Constitution relies for its
preservation. In this vein, ‘Constitution’ refers to the constitutional provisions of the
Constitution of 1960, while ‘constitutional law’ refers to the application of those
provisions through the ﬁlter of the doctrine of necessity. Through the Ibrahim
judgment, the doctrine of necessity in effect redeﬁned the scope, content, structure and
philosophy of the Constitution, yet without formally amending any of its provisions.4
The second distinctive character of the Cypriot constitutional context relates to
the judicial approach that is characterised by cosmopolitanism and by a traditional
reliance on the comparative methodology.5 It can be argued that the national system
2 Loizou 2001, pp. 12–31; Nicolaou 2000, pp. 105–34; Evriviades 1975; Tornaritis 1980, pp. 54–
77.
3 Kombos 2015a, Chap. 2.
4 Kombos 2015a.
5 Kombos 2015b, Chap. 3; Hatzimihail 2013.
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was developed with direct references to foreign jurisdictions. The nexus with
comparative law as a special feature of the Cypriot legal order has been explained
with reference to historical factors.6 These relate to the organic evolution of the
legal system, thus classifying Cyprus as part of ‘the mixed-jurisdictions
sub-genre’.7 This argument is supported with reference to the areas of family law
and contract law8 where there is a considerable body of evidence pointing to a
strong presence of common law principles. For example, Hatzimihail argues that
the three main Codes of the Cypriot legal system are directly derived from common
law and especially from the Nigerian Criminal Code, the Indian Contract Code and
also the Indian Civil Wrongs Code.
In the ﬁeld of public law, the creation and evolution of administrative law has
been marked by the strong influence of the Greek droit administratif.9 This is
evident in the form of frequent reliance on Greek academic works and on the case
law of the Greek Conseil d’Etat, to the point where it is reasonable to argue that it is
rare to ﬁnd a decision in the area of administrative law where reference is not made
either directly or indirectly to Greek academic works and/or Greek jurisprudence. It
must be noted that the codiﬁcation of administrative law took place in 1999, and
thus until that point the evolution of administrative law by the Supreme Court took
place on a case-by-case basis.
The Cypriot legal system has also more generally used the comparative method
either as an independent source of law or as an auxiliary tool for supplementing
existing constitutional provisions. Reference to foreign jurisdictions extends
beyond the Greek context.10
The use of the comparativemethod – strong in intensity and dense in frequency – is
indicative of a willingness of the Supreme Court to be open to external sources of
influence. This characteristic of the judicial approach represents a benchmark for
analysing the degree and form of receptiveness that the Supreme Court has illustrated
in relation to EU law. The peculiarity relates to the scale and intensity of the use of the
comparative method on the one hand, and to the unjustiﬁed entrenchment of EU law
concepts and principles on the other.
As a corollary, the rather bold opening statement about the uniqueness of the
Cypriot constitutional system is not an exaggerated claim influenced by an inherent
‘need’ to give priority and importance to the national constitutional idiosyncrasies
and peculiarities. Moreover, the preceding statement is not an expression of con-
stitutional patriotism dictated by an anachronistic inward approach to public law
6 Hatzimihail 2013.
7 Ibid., p. 39.
8 Ibid.
9 Hatzimihail 2013, p. 79.
10 Kombos 2015b, Chap. 3; Hatzimihail 2013.
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that is dictated by a pre-existing familiarity with national legal doctrines and
thought.11
Overall, the Cypriot constitutional culture reflects the normative and conceptual
modiﬁcations that have affected the system after the application of the
above-mentioned doctrine of necessity that has redeﬁned constitutional law in
pragmatic terms.12 Accordingly, the Cypriot example can be classiﬁed in a hybrid
category that falls between classical and evolutionary constitutions.13 The former
tend to have a strict and pure legal character that is founded on rigidity, normative
hierarchy and effective judicial protection, while the latter tend to be more evolu-
tionary, historic and political in nature.14 In the case of Cyprus, the Constitution of
1960 is founded on strict adherence to the hierarchical supremacy of the consti-
tutional provisions (Art. 179), combined with a permanency of the system that is
reflected in the long list of unamendable provisions (Art. 182 and Annex III)
whereby 48 out of the 199 constitutional provisions have perpetual status. It must
be noted that in that list, only one article relates to fundamental human rights (Art.
23 on the right to property). To that effect, De Smith has argued that the
Constitution of 1960 is ‘the most rigid, detailed and complicated constitution in the
world’,15 and has also stated that
[t]he Constitution of Cyprus is … weighted down by checks and balances, procedural and
substantive safeguards, guarantees and prohibitions. Constitutionalism has run riot in
harness with Communalism. The Government of the Republic must be carried on, but never
have the chosen representatives of a political majority been set so daunting an obstacle
course by the constitution makers.16
Therefore, the Cypriot constitutional system is inherently a classical Constitution
yet with certain important and influential special features. First, the Constitution is
the outcome of international law applied in an unusual form. Speciﬁcally, the nature
of the process of decolonisation and the actual method for the transfer of power to a
newly formed independent state in 1960 were decided in principle and also in detail
in Zurich, by Greece and Turkey, in the physical absence of the legally responsible
entity that was the colonial power (Great Britain). That paradox is signiﬁcant, as
Great Britain within days of the conclusion of the international agreement between
Greece and Turkey stated its acceptance of all the terms with just one single addition
in relation to the status of the military bases that it was to retain on the island. The
Zurich agreement had 17 points that would form the organisational core of the new
state, and those were to create the framework and the content of the new
Constitution. Thus, the right of self-determination and, more importantly, the right to
exercise primary constitutive power found no expression in the case of Cyprus.
11 Legrand 2002, pp. 246 and 255.
12 Soulioti 2006.
13 Birkinshaw and Kombos 2009; Kombos 2010a.
14 Besselink 2006, p. 113 et seq.; Albi 2005, p. 22 et seq.
15 De Smith 1964, p. 285.
16 Ibid.
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No referendum was called and no constituent assembly was formed. Secondly, the
Cypriot example is also characterised by the attribution of the role of guardian to
Great Britain, Greece and Turkey through the Treaty of Guarantee. Their role
included the safeguard of the constitutional status quo, thus creating an impasse in
the event of the need to modify the Constitution and its philosophy because of
functionality problems. Thus the Cypriot Constitution is simultaneously a classical
constitution and also deviates from that blueprint due to the restriction of the exercise
of constitutive power at the moment of inception and at any later stage.
At the same time, the Cypriot constitutional system is undoubtedly also an
evolutionary constitution because the application of the doctrine of necessity after
Ibrahim has created a parallel constitutional world, as explained above.
Nonetheless, the maintenance at a formal and normative level of the original
Constitution, even after the application of the doctrine of necessity, has the effect of
excluding the characterisation of the system as purely evolutionary.
By way of summary, the Cypriot paradigm thus represents a hybrid model that
does not fall in either of the two categories in a mutually exclusive manner, but
rather belongs to both categories.
1.1.2 The position of the Constitution in such an open and evolving constitutional
system that has been redeﬁned in a fundamental way by the doctrine of necessity
remains central with regard to the rationale of the judiciary. The rationale and the
role of the Constitution remain paramount in the sense of ensuring full effective
judicial protection, the rule of law, separation of powers and the principle of
legality. The concept of sovereignty and the organisation of the state take a sub-
sidiary role in the approach of the Court for different reasons. As regards the
organisation of the state, the doctrine of necessity has an important impact, since it
enables the restructuring of state organs in order to ensure functionality. In terms of
the concept of sovereignty, the Supreme Court has in the past placed emphasis on
the need to preserve the formal status of constitutional provisions by restricting the
possibility of amendments as a way to ensure the preservation of the Republic at the
level of public international law (see Sect. 1.2). Overall, the emphasis is on the rule
of law and effective judicial protection, and these can be considered to be the
foundations for the judicial approach towards the Constitution.
The Courts have to strike a delicate balance between the actual constitutional
provisions and the application of the doctrine of necessity; in general, two cate-
gories of cases can be identiﬁed. First, there are the cases where the full application
of a constitutional provision is not possible due to the withdrawal of the
Turkish-Cypriot Community, thus triggering the application of the doctrine of
necessity. Secondly, there are the cases where a constitutional provision has
remained unaffected by the withdrawal of the Turkish-Cypriots and, in those
instances, the Constitution remains the paramount guiding source. One such area is
the protection of fundamental rights that the Constitution fully provides for in
Part II.17 In such cases the doctrine of necessity has remained non-applicable almost
17 Kombos and Pantazi 2012; Kombos et al. 2015.
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entirely18 because the Court places the centre of gravity on the protection of fun-
damental rights (see Sect. 2.2).
One special feature of the Cypriot Constitution in relation to fundamental rights
that can be seen as part of the national constitutional identity is the protection of
social rights. The Constitution by a series of articles guarantees the individual
certain social and economic rights, which are to be exercised within the framework
of the public interest and common good (see Sects. 2.1–2.2).
1.2 The Amendment of Constitution in Relation
to the European Union
1.2.1–1.2.4 Prior to EU accession, the Constitution was amended in relation to the
EU only as regards the independence of the Central Bank. The Fourth
Constitutional Amendment, introduced by Law 104 (I)/2002, amended Arts. 147,
118 and 119 of the Constitution to ensure the independence of the Central Bank in
terms of restricting the dismissal of the Governor and also to exclude any political
supervision of the Bank.
After EU accession, the Constitution was amended in 2006 by the Fifth
Amendment of the Constitution Law19 in order to accommodate the introduction
and application of the basic principles of EU law.
By way of the history of its introduction, during the lengthy process of imple-
mentation of the acquis communautaire, the need to amend the Constitution was
considered, and a formal recommendation was made to extensively amend the
Constitution in order to facilitate accession to the European Union.20 However, at
ﬁrst the decision was taken that such a course of action was not necessary for three
main reasons that are related to the external recognition of the Republic, to the
limits of the doctrine of necessity and to the complexity of the provision governing
constitutional amendments. In particular, the Supreme Court initially,21 in the
1980s, rejected attempts to amend the Constitution on the basis that the votes of the
Turkish-Cypriot Members of Parliament were required under Art. 182(3) of the
Constitution. This could have been remedied through the doctrine of necessity.
Nonetheless, the approach of the Supreme Court was to reject the use of the
doctrine, which is deemed an exceptional measure to be used in the most extreme
situations where the existence of the state is endangered. As such, its application
18 For the rare examples where the opposite applied see Kombos 2015a, Chap. 6.
19 Law No. 127(I)/2006, Ofﬁcial Gazette No. 4090, 28.7.2006, Annex I(I), p. 1372, available in
English at http://www.olc.gov.cy/olc/olc.nsf/all/EC240D2A9413ABBB4225793A00403484/$ﬁle/
The%20Fifth%20Amendment%20of%20the%20Constitution%20Law%20of%202006.pdf?
openelement.
20 Lycourgos 2010, pp. 102–03.
21 President of the Republic v. House of Representatives [1985] 3 CLR 2224; President of the
Republic v. House of Representatives [1986] 3 CLR 1439.
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must have a temporary effect. A constitutional amendment would have a permanent
effect, and hence the doctrine of necessity cannot be used to enable the enactment of
a constitutional amendment.22 Although that approach was subsequently reversed,
the crucial point is that the rationale against constitutional amendments remained
relatively strong and influential.
In relation to EU accession, it was thought that a solution would be found
through a judicial method whereby the provisions of the Constitution would be
interpreted in the light of Art. 169 of the Constitution that refers to the status of
international treaties and also in the light of the doctrine of necessity. As a result, it
was hoped that the courts would enable the effective and efﬁcient participation of
the Republic in the EU by harmoniously construing the obligations arising from EU
membership with national constitutional law.
The key in the preferred approach was Art. 169(3) of the Constitution that grants
superior force against any conflicting municipal law to ratiﬁed Treaties (see Sects.
3.1–3.2). This basic rule was supplemented by the adoption of Law No. 35(III)/2003,
with which the House of Representatives approved the ratiﬁcation of the Accession
Treaty. The Law contained the important Art. 4, which stated in clear terms that ‘[t]
he rights and obligations deriving from the Treaty [of Accession] are directly
applicable in the Republic and take precedence over any contrary legal or regulatory
provision’. The formula used secured the primacy of EU law against all conflicting
acts originating from national law, yet it fell short from regulating the relationship
between national constitutional law and EU law.
This obvious shortcoming emerged in Attorney General of the Republic v.
Costas Constantinou.23 The case concerned the implementation of the European
Arrest Warrant (EAW) Framework Decision (FD)24 by Law 133(1)/2004, and the
issuing of an order to surrender Mr. Constantinou to the United Kingdom, which
will be discussed in greater detail in Sect. 2.3. The Supreme Court held that the
Framework Decision could not prevail over Art. 11 of the Constitution that
expressly prohibits the extradition of Cypriot nationals,25 despite the fact that the
Supreme Court acknowledged the case law of the Court of Justice of the European
Union (CJEU) on the principle of primacy of EU law. Accordingly, the Supreme
Court declared the incompatibility of the national implementing law with the
Constitution, which according to Art. 179 of the Constitution renders the law
invalid. Moreover, the Supreme Court in effect indirectly dictated the need for a
constitutional amendment without stating so, thus giving the impression that the
solution remains within the exclusive powers of the other branches of the state. This
approach is in line with the principle of separation of powers, but it also creates an
understanding that the subsequent normative accommodation of the primacy of EU
22 Kombos 2015a, Chap. 6.
23 [2005] 1 CLR 1356.
24 Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender
procedures between Member States (2002/584/JHA), [2002] OJ L 190/1.
25 Attorney General v. Afamis 1 R.S.C.C 121.
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law with regard to the Constitution must be full in order to ensure future compliance
with the yardstick that the Court applied in Constantinou. It is in this light that one
must read the subsequent Fifth Constitutional Amendment that, as will be explained
below, had an unnecessarily extensive scope.
The Court on ﬁrst sight safeguarded the hierarchy of the Constitution, but at the
same time it opened the door for the redeﬁnition of that hierarchical position. This
was perhaps a clear outcome dictated by express constitutional provisions that
limited the room for harmonious interpretation, but at the same time the open-ended
invitation to amend the Constitution without deﬁning the limits of what could be
acceptable represents a serious shortcoming. Such an approach contradicts the
traditional vigilance that the Supreme Court has shown with regard to constitutional
amendments. In addition, the decision could be contrasted with that of the German
Bundesverfassungsgericht in the Lisbon Judgment,26 which provides an interesting
example of the ‘proactive approach’, representing a judicial pronouncement – at the
earliest possible opportunity – on what would interfere with the Constitution and
the separation of powers.
In terms of the content and character of the Fifth Constitutional Amendment,
which, as noted earlier, was introduced (two years) after EU accession in 2006, the
original idea was to ensure the primacy of EU law in one single article of the
Constitution that would then function as the point of reference for any incompat-
ibility arising between EU law and national constitutional law. This is now Art. 1A
of the Constitution. Nonetheless, it must be noted that despite the fact that intro-
duction of an umbrella provision was the selected model, the provisions of the Fifth
Constitutional Amendment took a completely different form in terms of method-
ology and approach. There were instead a nexus of constitutional provisions that
were amended in addition to the introduction of the single umbrella provision: in
addition to Art. 1A, a paragraph was added to Arts. 140 and 169, and alterations
were made to Arts. 11(2) and 179 of the Constitution.
Speciﬁcally, Art. 1A states:
No provision of this Constitution shall be considered as invalidating laws enacted, acts
done or measures adopted by the Republic necessitated by its obligations as a Member State
of the European Union or shall prevent Regulations, Directives or other acts or binding
measures of a legislative character adopted by the European Union or by the European
Communities or by their institutions or by their competent bodies under the provisions of
the treaties founding the European Communities or the European Union, from having legal
effect in the Republic.
It is submitted that there is a crucial problem with Art. 1A, and that problem has
both formal and substantial aspects. Formally, as explained above, Art. 182(1) of
the Constitution, read in combination with Annex III of the Constitution, creates a
long list of non-amendable articles of the Constitution, which includes Art. 1. The
addition of para. A to Art. 1 is only indirectly justiﬁed in the Preamble of the Fifth
Constitutional Amendment Law as not amounting to a constitutional amendment of
26 BVerfG, Judgment of 30 June 2009 - 2 BvE 2/08 - Rn. (1-421).
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a basic constitutional provision. It is submitted that this approach is not correct and
is at best playing with formalism, because an addition to any article of the
Constitution cannot be construed as anything other than a constitutional amend-
ment. At the same time, the insertion in Art. 1 was deliberate in order to pre-empt
any future constitutional amendment. Moreover, it is submitted that the issue is
made clear by Art. 182 of the Constitution:
1. The Articles or parts of Articles of this Constitution set out in Annex III hereto which
have been incorporated from the Zurich Agreement dated 11th February, 1959, are the
basic Articles of this Constitution and cannot, in any way, be amended, whether by way of
variation, addition or repeal.
2. Subject to para. 1 of this Article any provision of this Constitution may be amended,
whether by way of variation, addition or repeal, as provided in para. 3 of this Article.
3. Such amendment shall be made by a law passed by a majority vote comprising at least
two-thirds of the total number of the Representatives belonging to the Greek Community
and at least two-thirds of the total number of the Representatives belonging to the Turkish
Community.
Accordingly, there is a clear question about the constitutionality of the Law
introducing the Fifth Constitutional Amendment. There has never before or since
been any amendment of a basic constitutional provision.
Moreover, besides Art. 1A, further amendments were introduced to other parts
of the Constitution – Arts. 11(2), 140, 169 and 179.
Lastly, it would have been expected that the Supreme Court would have at least
examined even as obiter the nature and even validity of the introduction of Art. 1A;
this has never happened so far. Yet, it is imperative that the Supreme Court take a
position on the matter, as the issue exceeds by far the matter of primacy of EU law.
Furthermore, it would have been preferable to implement the choice of intro-
ducing an umbrella clause by amending Art. 179, which guarantees the supremacy
of the Constitution and, in terms of structural coherency, it would have represented
the obvious place for such a clause. As to the possible argument that Art. 179 could
be further amended in the future and thus it would not present a permanent solution,
the answer has three parts. First, it is not axiomatic that the Republic should make
the acceptance of the principle of primacy of EU law perpetually permanent, as it
can theoretically decide to exit the Union. Secondly, the introduction of the prin-
ciple of primacy of EU law in Art. 179 would have the same permanency as that of
Art. 1A, since nothing would restrict the House of Representatives from repealing
that paragraph. Thirdly, one must balance the importance of accommodating the
principle of primacy of EU law in a permanent way with the need to safeguard the
non-amendable nature of the fundamental constitutional provisions, which is by far
and without question the most important consideration.
The next step in the normative solution was to complement Art. 1A with the
amendment of the non-basic provisions to be found in Arts. 169, 179, 140 and 11 of
the Constitution. Article 179, in its amended form, reads as follows:
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1. Without prejudice to the provisions of Art. 1A, the Constitution shall be the supreme law
of the Republic.
2. No law or decision of the House of Representatives or of any of the Communal
Chambers and no act or decision of any organ, authority or person in the Republic exer-
cising executive power or any administrative function shall in any way be repugnant to, or
inconsistent with, any of the provisions of this Constitution or any obligation imposed on
the Republic as a result of its participation as a Member State in the European Union.
In terms of the effect of the preceding provision, Lycourgos correctly observes
that:
[t]he combined effect of the new Art. 1A and of Art. 179 as amended, is that not only
Community law but also EU law has been recognized as taking precedence over the
Constitution. In that respect, the principle enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic of
Cyprus preceded even the case law of the ECJ, which never expressly held that the acts
adopted under the Union’s third pillar – as it was at the time the ﬁfth constitutional
amendment – had precedence over national constitutional provisions.27
However, from the preceding approach arises a serious substantive problem: it
had, at the time, the effect that the Republic of Cyprus gave a more extensive scope
and effect to the principle of primacy of EU law than what the jurisprudence of the
ECJ required. Although the issue has lost its relevance since the entry into force of
the Lisbon Treaty, before that, the EU and the EC dimension had clearly been
distinguished under Union law, with the ECJ jurisdiction having been limited in
relation to the Second and Third Pillars. This in a comparative perspective is
perhaps unprecedented. The Supreme Court remained silent on the issue.
The remaining amendments concerned Art. 11(2) in relation to extradition under
the European Arrest Warrant, which will be explored in Sect. 2.3, and Arts. 140 and
169, which will subsequently be explored here.
Under Art. 140, as applied after 1964, the President of the Republic may, prior to
the promulgation of any law or decision of the House of Representatives, refer to
the Supreme Court for its opinion as to whether such act is inconsistent with the
Constitution. With the Fifth Constitutional Amendment, this power was extended to
the compatibility of a law or decision of the House of Representatives with the ‘law
of the European Communities or of the European Union’.
The difﬁculty arises from the way in which the power of the President is
exercised in practice. Traditionally, the Art. 140 power was exercised in instances
of a clear difference of opinion between the President and the Parliament and on
matters having a non-negligible political dimension and/or affecting the balance of
powers and/or impacting on the proper interpretation of the Constitution. In addi-
tion, the Attorney General advises the President on the propriety of making use of
Art. 140 and in practice, the view of the Attorney General is crucial. Compliance
with the often technical requirements of the obligations arising from EU law creates
a different setting, where the advisory role of the Attorney General is expected to be
27 Lycourgos 2010, p. 105.
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broadened; it marks a considerable shift towards a stronger advisory role of the
Attorney General.
As regards the extension of this jurisdiction to compatibility with EU obliga-
tions, it must be stressed that the point of reference for the exercise of the juris-
diction by the Supreme Court changes. The issue could very likely become one of
interpretation of what the EU obligations entail, thus opening the way for a pre-
liminary reference to the CJEU. In the event of a preliminary reference, the status of
the law will remain pending until the CJEU responds, thus creating, as Lycourgos
correctly argues, an issue of propriety and compliance with the principle of sepa-
ration of powers.28 The alternative for the Supreme Court would be to deliberately
avoid making a preliminary reference, thus distancing the Court from the correct
application of Art. 267 TFEU. Therefore, the amendment of Art. 140 of the
Constitution seems to be creating more problems than it solves.
One such notable example was evident in President of the Republic v. House of
Representatives,29 which concerned non-compliance with Directive 2000/13/EC on
the approximation relating to the labelling, presentation and advertising of food-
stuffs,30 which required that all national implementing measures relating to the sale
of genetically modiﬁed foodstuffs in supermarkets had to be notiﬁed to the
European Commission and the other Member States. Moreover, only after three
months following that notiﬁcation and only if the Commission did not issue a
negative opinion could the national measures be introduced. An amendment to the
Foodstuffs (Control and Sale) Law came within the scope of the Directive, but the
notiﬁcation procedure had not been followed. As a result and on the advice of the
Attorney General, the President proceeded to refer the Law via the amended Art.
140 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court found that there was an apparent
procedural error that resulted in non-compliance with the EU obligations. The
ﬁnding in this case was relatively straightforward, as the issue was one of apparent
procedural infringement; however the same cannot be said in relation to more
complex situations.
One such complex situation arose in Reference 2/2013, President of the Republic
v. House of Representatives.31 The case concerned a conflict between a Law
adopted in 2012 on the protection of the seaside and the Services Directive.32 The
national Law, in which priority was given to the owner or operator of a seaside
hotel or recreational business in relation to the tender procedure for leasing the
relevant part of the beach, went against the Directive’s requirement that the
licensing system should not be discriminatory and disproportionate. In this case,
which will be explored in greater detail in Sect. 2.2, the President referred the
28 Ibid., p. 107–08.
29 [2008] 3 CLR 118.
30 [2000] OJ L 109/29.
31 9 May 2014.
32 Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on
services in the internal market, [2006] OJ L 376/36.
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incompatibility to the Supreme Court under Art. 140 of the Constitution. The
decision of the Supreme Court made note of the CJEU case law that the Attorney
General cited in his argumentation, but at the same time the Court did not make any
speciﬁc reference to those cases. Moreover, the issue concerned the application of
the principle of proportionality, which by nature has an element of subjectivity and
creates room for different approaches. However, the Supreme Court was unanimous
in deciding that there was an apparent incompatibility between the Law and the
Directive. The matter in this case was one of substance rather than procedure, and
the Court made the correct assessment. Nevertheless, the assessment was much
more complex than that necessitated in the earlier case, which gives rise to concerns
relating to the selection of instances where Art. 140 is used and the manner of
deciding such cases in the context of a preliminary reference.
Finally, there is also a technical issue regarding a gap that has emerged in
relation to secondary legislation (i.e. regulations, etc., introduced by the executive
but the approval of which is to be decided by the legislature) that is often the means
used for completing the implementation of directives. Such measures cannot be the
subject of a reference under Art. 140, since under Arts. 51 and 140 of the
Constitution, the President is not required to sign them. The issue came to the
surface in the aftermath of the Supreme Court decision in the same case, Reference
2/2013. The House of Representatives had modiﬁed regulations submitted by the
executive that were intended to comply with the provisions of the Services
Directive in the context of the licensing system that would apply for seaside
establishments wishing to take commercial advantage of the seaside (sunbeds,
water sports, etc.). The relevant regulations that the House of Representatives had
adopted introduced a discriminatory scheme whereby it was considered an
advantage if an applicant for a license had experience (5 years) in providing ser-
vices in the speciﬁc area. Therefore, despite the earlier ruling of the Supreme Court
and the clear provision of the Directive, the adopted regulations reintroduced a
discriminatory system. According to Cypriot constitutional law, secondary legis-
lation cannot be the subject of a reference under Art. 140. Consequently, the
problem of incompatibility arose and resulted in the Ministry of Interior asking the
local authorities to not comply with the regulations on the basis of the ECJ decision
in Fratelli Costanzo.33 There the ECJ held that ‘administrative authorities,
including municipal authorities, are under the same obligation as a national court to
apply the provisions of… [a] Directive and to refrain from applying provisions of
national law which conflict with them’,34 provided that the relevant provision has
direct effect.35 According to related case law of the ECJ, the scope of application
must be construed in the light of the principles of national procedural autonomy and
national institutional autonomy. Therefore, an interesting gap in relation to Art.
140 of the Constitution exists that creates further doubts as to its effectiveness,
33 Case C-103/88 Fratelli Costanzo v. Commune di Milano [1989] ECR 01839.
34 Ibid., para. 33.
35 Ibid., paras. 29–32.
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given its non-applicability to secondary legislation. Moreover, attempts are made to
ﬁll the gap in by relying on the Fratelli Costanzo rule which has, as its basic
precondition, the direct effect of the EU law provision. But the issue then arises as
to who has the authority to make such a complicated determination, since the
obligation to apply such secondary legislation often rests on administrative
authorities. This creates issues of legal certainty, expertise and separation of
powers. All of these matters surfaced in the example in question and, at the time of
writing, the outcome is uncertain.
To summarise, it must be questioned whether the constitutional amendment of
Art. 140 of the Constitution was necessary given the problems arising from its
application and the rarity of its use.
The Fifth Constitutional Amendment additionally added a new para. 4 to Art.
169 to the Constitution, which reads as follows:
4. The Republic may exercise every choice and discretion provided for in the Treaties
establishing the European Communities and the Treaty on European Union and in any
Treaties which amend or replace the above and which are concluded by the Republic.
This provision and its rationale are once again forward-thinking. The provision
shields the national act related with the exercise of the option from scrutiny as to its
constitutionality. The question is whether it should, given that there is a clear
distinction between obligation and option. The ECJ founded the creation of primacy
of EU law on the basis of a paramount need for the effectiveness, uniformity and
structural coherence of the legal system of the Union. The justifying rationale for
the principle of primacy of EU law, however, does not apply to the exercise of
options by Member States before they decide to make use of their discretion.
Therefore, the amendment of Art. 169 cannot be justiﬁed with reference to the need
to comply with the principle of primacy of EU law.
The Constitution was subsequently further amended in 2010 (Sixth Amendment,
of Art. 17 of the Constitution) with regard to the Data Retention Directive36 in the
aftermath of the Supreme Court judgment in Alexandrou; the details will be pro-
vided in Sect. 2.4.
Finally, Art. 11 of the Constitution was amended on a further occasion in 2013
by introducing the Seventh Amendment of the Constitution via Law 68(I)/2003, in
order to allow the extradition of Cypriot citizens in connection to events that took
place at any time even before accession to the EU; the details will be provided in
Sect. 2.3.
In general, the opinions of legal scholars were not requested during the process
of introducing the above amendments, with the exception of the Fifth Constitutional
amendment for which consultation took place, at an earlier stage of the discussion,
about the need for a full revision of the Constitution. At the time of writing, no
36 Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the
retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available
electronic communications services or of public communications networks and amending
Directive 2002/58/EC, [2006] OJ L 105/54.
1386 C. Kombos and S. Laulhé Shaelou
other constitutional amendments relating to EU law are being discussed; however
there are areas where such discussion could be useful. For instance, the whole logic
of the Fifth Constitutional Amendment, as explained previously, needs to be
re-examined since it is problematic and overly expansive. In addition, the Sixth
Constitutional Amendment is now equally problematic given that the Data
Retention Directive has been annulled by the CJEU.
1.3 Conceptualising Sovereignty and the Limits
to the Transfer of Powers
1.3.1 The provisions on supremacy of EU law were provided in Sect. 1.2.
1.3.2 The issue of the transfer or delegation of powers to the EU has not been at the
epicentre of the debate in Cyprus because the prevailing view sees participation in
the EU as a matter of political determination that was expressed through accession
to the Union. Therefore, any delegation or transfer of competences is understood as
an expression of the will of the sovereign state and as a matter of choice that attracts
the full accommodation of the international obligations of the Republic. If such
membership requires the effective transfer or delegation of powers and if that in
practice commands the amendment of the Constitution, then any such adjustment is
perceived as being nothing more than the expression of the Republic’s will. On this
basis, the Fifth Constitutional Amendment and the previous decision of the
Supreme Court in Constantinou can both be explained as an expression of the
intention to participate in the EU system and as a voluntary limitation of powers.
1.3.3 Nonetheless, the extensive scope of the Fifth Constitutional Amendment, as
explained in detail above, is so open-ended that it signiﬁcantly constrains any room
for disagreement. This is problematic because the Supreme Court has so far failed
to develop a reservation formula that would set limits as to what is constitutionally
acceptable. Moreover, this approach places Cyprus in the minority of Member
States that have accepted the principle of primacy of EU law without serious
reservations. Put differently, the Cypriot approach is purely national in nature and
founded on what the Constitution provides in the aftermath of the amendment.
There is no judicial elaboration as to the limitations that apply to the scope of the
relevant constitutional amendment.
There has only been one notable attempt to discuss the limits of the principle of
primacy of EU law and of the transfer of powers to the EU, the dissenting opinion
of Judge Erotokritou in the ‘bail in’ case. The case concerned the imposition of a
levy amounting to partial conﬁscation of all unsecured deposits, i.e. below 100,000
EUR, in the two systemic Cypriot banks. The dissenting judge underlined the
signiﬁcance of ensuring, through judicial review, that any European and national
mechanism forming the foundation for the imposition of a bail-in, respects fun-
damental rights and the rule of law. The case and the dissenting opinion will be
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explored in greater detail in Sect. 2.7.3, drawing parallels with the German
Constitutional Court’s Honeywell judgment.
1.3.4 As seen in Sect. 1.2, the amended Art. 179(1) provides that ‘[w]ithout prej-
udice to the provisions of Art. 1A, the Constitution shall be the supreme law of the
Republic’. The Constitution has to give way in case of a conflict with EU law, and
that would logically trigger a constitutional amendment. As seen with the EAW
saga, the rectiﬁcation of the incompatibility took years.
1.4 Democratic Control
1.4.1–1.4.2 In relation to applicable rules that govern the participation of the
national parliament in the EU decision-making processes, in the case of Cyprus, no
such rules exist. Moreover, no referendum has ever taken place in relation to the EU
nor has there being any discussion about one.
1.5 The Reasons for, and the Role of, EU Amendments
1.5.1 As explained in greater detail in Sect. 1.2, on the one hand, the guiding
background premise has been the traditional reluctance of the judiciary to approve
constitutional amendments; on the other hand, the Supreme Court through its ruling
in Constantinou in effect required the introduction of a constitutional amendment
that would govern the relationship between EU law and the national constitutional
order. The outcome was the introduction of the Fifth Constitutional Amendment
that has an overly expansive scope and leaves little, if any, room for the subsequent
establishment of speciﬁc boundaries for the relationship between EU law and
Cypriot constitutional law. By way of an additional point of background infor-
mation, the approach behind the amendment was modelled on the method of
Art. 29(4)(3) of the Irish Constitution (now Art. 29(3)(10)).37 The original idea was
to ensure the primacy of EU law in one single article of the Constitution that would
then function as the point of reference for any incompatibility of EU law with
national constitutional law. That is now Art. 1A. Nonetheless, it must be noted that
despite the fact that the introduction of an umbrella provision was based on the Irish
model, the provisions of the Fifth Constitutional Amendment eventually took a
completely different form in terms of methodology and approach. There is instead a
37 Lycourgos 2010, pp. 104–106.
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nexus of constitutional provisions that were amended in addition to the introduction
of the single umbrella provision inserted in the Constitution (Arts. 11, 140, 169,
179).
1.5.2 The Cypriot example has two distinct phases in relation to EU-related con-
stitutional amendments. The ﬁrst phase, which lasted until 2006, was characterised
by the conscious decision not to introduce a constitutional amendment in relation to
EU law. The rationale related to the pre-existing caution towards constitutional
amendments for reasons having to do with the doctrine of necessity, the protection
of the international status of the Republic, political reasons and the complexity of
the procedure for constitutional amendments. The second phase is characterised by
the introduction of the Fifth Constitutional Amendment that has been extremely
open and accommodating for EU law.
In relation to the issue of ‘waning constitutionalism’ raised in the Questionnaire,
such argumentation has not appeared in the Cypriot context as a factor that could
influence the decisions during either the ﬁrst or the second phase. The rationale for
both periods has been pragmatic and has reflected the approach that the Supreme
Court had adopted at different stages. The shift in the judicial approach in the
second phase was influenced by the clear clash between competing supremacies,
namely the primacy of EU law and the supremacy of the Constitution. As a result,
the judicial reasoning was founded on formal and substantive hierarchy and mir-
rored considerations relating to functionality and pragmatism.
1.5.3 The symbiosis of the national constitutional order with supranational legal
orders that have dense constitutional characteristics is becoming more difﬁcult as
the areas of coexistence start to include ﬁelds traditionally associated with the state.
The need to deﬁne and regulate the boundaries between the legal orders is
becoming pressing, and the introduction of constitutional amendments represents
the most preferable option for two reasons. First, the regulation of the relationship
thus stems from the expression of the will of the state that is reflected in the
Constitution. This is signiﬁcant for symbolic and substantive reasons, as it justiﬁes
the transfer of powers from the national level to the supranational level by direct
reference to the national Constitution. In addition, any amendment would be
introduced on the basis of the usually enhanced procedures that require a higher
threshold of democratic approval, thus attributing a much-needed element of
legitimacy to the relationship between the national and the supranational legal
orders. Secondly, the solution of introducing a constitutional amendment is the
most functional way to delimit the boundaries, reinforce legal certainty and provide
the opportunity to express any reservations that the state decides to apply as to those
limits. Such considerations are speciﬁcally relevant in relation to the primacy of EU
law, fundamental rights and the allocation of competences.
The Cypriot Constitution Under the Impact of EU Law … 1389
2 Constitutional Rights, the Rule of Law and EU Law
2.1 The Position of Constitutional Rights and the Rule
of Law in the Constitution
2.1.1 The position of fundamental rights in the Cypriot constitutional system is
central both in terms of their provision and effective protection. The 1960
Constitution contains an extensive bill of rights in Part II (‘Fundamental Rights and
Liberties’), which in terms of content is similar38 to that of the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and, as Kyriacou39 and Pikis40 rightly
observe, the provisions of which in ‘certain instances are wider in scope and
substance compared to their counterparts found in the [Convention]’.41 Moreover,
the Constitution by a series of articles guarantees certain social and economic
rights42 to the individual which are to be exercised within the framework of the
public interest and common good.43 The relevant provisions are detailed and
comprehensive, and the judiciary has been extremely active in ensuring the full
protection of these rights.
It can be argued that the level and content of the judicial protection of fundamental
rights has been developed in direct connection with the ECHR system, in which
Cyprus participated as part of the colony regime even before independence in 1960.
The ECHR has been used as a guiding factor for establishing the level of protection
and it has become particularly relevant where there has been ambiguity either in the
constitutional text44 or in the facts of a speciﬁc case. Moreover, the Cypriot system
has exceeded the standard that the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)
requires in numerous cases, with the Supreme Court making direct reference to the
need to adopt a higher standard of protection.45
In relation to general principles of law, this concept is present and active in the
Cypriot system of public law, either as an independent source of law or as an
auxiliary tool used for supplementing existing constitutional provisions. Such
general principles can be directly derived from the common law that provides the
early foundation for the Cypriot legal system (due process, audi alteram partem);
38 Kombos and Pantazi 2012.
39 Kyriacou 2010, p. 2.
40 Pikis 2006, p. 43.
41 Kyriacou 2010, p. 2.
42 Tornaritis 1968, clariﬁes that Professor Bridel, who assisted in the drafting of the Constitution,
recommended the incorporation of the liberty to work, trade and industry, liberty of contract and
the right to strike.
43 Tornaritis 1968, p. 2.
44 For example, Attorney General v. Afamis, n. 25.
45 Charalambous and others v. Republic, Joined cases 1480/2011, 11 June 2014; Police v.
Ekdotiki Eteria [1982] 2 CLR 63; David Scattergood v. Attorney General [2005] 1 CLR 142 (see
Sect. 2.3 below).
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they are primarily procedural in nature yet with a substantive effect on the essence
of the basic right to fair trial. Nonetheless, the influence of such principles has
remained limited due to the fact that the Constitution exhaustively covers the rights
to fair trial and personal liberty in a combined manner through Arts. 11, 12 and 30.
In terms of general principles not resulting directly from the Constitution, the
most notable example is the principle of proportionality. Proportionality has been
given an elevated status through the codiﬁcation of the general principles of
administrative law in Art. 52 of Law 158(I)/99. Nonetheless, proportionality
already had a constitutional position as an unwritten principle of law and has been
referred to by the Supreme Court in the landmark judgment Ibrahim (see Sect. 1.1)
as an essential criterion to be met in order for the constitutionally crucial doctrine of
necessity to be applicable. The overall effect is that the principle of proportionality
is not just a general principle of law with constitutional status, but it also constitutes
an integral criterion for the assessment of the foundation of the Constitution post
1964, that is, the doctrine of necessity.
2.1.2 The Constitution in Art. 33 provides for the conditions under which
restrictions can be imposed on rights:
1. Subject to the provisions of this Constitution relating to a state of emergency, the
fundamental rights and liberties guaranteed by this Part shall not be subjected to any other
limitations or restrictions than those in this Part provided.
2. The provisions of this Part relating to such limitations or restrictions shall be interpreted
strictly and shall not be applied for any purpose other than those for which they have been
prescribed.
Further considerations pertaining to Art. 33 will be explored in Sect. 2.2.
2.1.3 The Cypriot Constitution makes no express reference to the concept of the
rule of law, but this has not stopped the judiciary from positioning the concept at the
epicentre of our constitutional law.
The clearest example of the general approach towards the rule of law can be
found in the above-mentioned landmark judgment Ibrahim where the Supreme
Court introduced the doctrine of necessity. The foundation for the decision was that
after the withdrawal of the Turkish-Cypriots and the resignation of the two foreign
judges, the administration of justice could not function, which thus directly affected
the rights of the individual in a negative way. The consequence of this was to
nullify the meaning of the rule of law that was deﬁned as being inherently inter-
linked with judicial supervision and effective judicial protection, fundamental rights
and the principle of legality. This approach, which led to the introduction of the
doctrine of necessity, has since permeated the Cypriot legal system.
In terms of justiciability, both parties to legal proceedings and the national courts
frequently use the principle of the rule of law, but the principle is not independently
justiciable. Rather, the invocation of the rule of law is combined with other legal
principles that are content-speciﬁc in a manner that is constitutionally precise. The
general perception as to the rule of law is that it represents the fundamental
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principle for the legal system and it forms part of all other constitutional principles
that are to be construed with the principle of the rule of law in mind.
One such manifestation of the rule of law is access to courts, especially in
relation to judicial review proceedings. Article 146 of the Constitution guarantees
access to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as an administrative court in a
liberal and generous way.46 Speciﬁcally, Art. 146(2) states that ‘[s]uch a recourse
may be made by a person whose any existing legitimate interest, which he has
either as a person or by virtue of being a member of a Community, is adversely and
directly affected by such decision or act or omission’.
Furthermore, the principle of the rule of law is present in the constitutional
provisions that prohibit retroactivity (Art. 24(3) in relation to tax law and Art. 12(1)
in relation to criminal law, see Sect. 2.3.2) and that guarantee legal certainty.
Articles 3 and 104 require the publication of all laws as an essential requirement for
their validity.
2.2 The Balancing of Fundamental Rights and Economic
Freedoms in EU Law
2.2.1 In Cyprus, the balancing exercise pertaining to the protection of classic
constitutional and/or fundamental rights must initially be considered with respect to
the application of the doctrine of necessity (as developed in more detail in
Sect. 1.1). In Alloupas v. National bank of Greece,47 it was held by the majority of
the Supreme Court of Cyprus that constitutional rights may only be restricted on the
express basis of the Constitution and by applying the ‘strictest possible’ criteria of
necessity (does a state of necessity exist) and of proportionality (are such restric-
tions proportionate to the necessity).48 As seen in Sect. 2.1.1, the principle of
proportionality has been granted constitutional status as an ‘unwritten principle of
law’, and it was referred to by the Supreme Court as an ‘essential criterion’ in the
application of the doctrine of necessity. If the Supreme Court initially gave a rather
wide interpretation to the principle of proportionality, starting with the Ibrahim
case, it did so when the application of the doctrine of necessity ‘did not concern the
exercise of legislative powers by the executive, or the restriction of fundamental
individual rights’.49 The Court also gave a narrow interpretation to the principle of
proportionality and refused to consider administrative acts of a ﬁnal nature, decided
by an administrative organ out of its own discretion (not deriving from a law) as
46 See Kombos 2010b.
47 [1983] 1 CLR 55.
48 Emilianides 2013, p. 47.
49 Ibid., pp. 42–4.
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justiﬁed on the basis of the doctrine of necessity,50 for the reason that administrative
acts are not general in nature and are therefore more likely to be arbitrary. As a
result, ‘[a]dministrative acts of a ﬁnal nature could not themselves be justiﬁed on
the grounds of the doctrine of necessity; however, administrative acts of a ﬁnal
nature which were based on a law, which was justiﬁed on the grounds of the
doctrine of necessity, would also be justiﬁed’.51 Thus, it appears that the protection
of constitutionally safeguarded fundamental rights in Cyprus has remained largely
outside of the scope of the doctrine of necessity, as also noted in Sect. 1.1.2 of the
Report.
It was seen in Sect. 2.1 that the Constitution contains a detailed and extensive list
of rights, which at times are more extensive than comparable rights under the
ECHR, and that in the case of doubt, the interpretation favours the individual over
the state. According to Emilianides, the protection of the rule of law is a ‘cardinal
principle’ of the Constitution.52 This, combined with the supremacy of the
Constitution, means that ‘the courts have the power to examine the constitutionality
of both laws and action of the administration and that no law, regulation or
administrative act may be inconsistent with the Constitution’.53 This means that a
trial court (i.e. any court other than the Supreme Court) has the power to declare
unconstitutional any law which is contrary to the provisions safeguarding individual
human rights as set out in the Constitution. This is the result of the mixed character
that applies to the system of review of constitutionality in Cyprus after 1964
whereby the examination of claims of unconstitutionality is diffused and decen-
tralised. This also entails that constitutionally safeguarded fundamental rights must
be interpreted in favour of the individual protected rather than the state in case of
doubt.54
As far as restrictions or limitations to constitutionally safeguarded fundamental
rights are concerned, it is stated in Art. 33(1) of the Constitution that these can only
be contained in express provisions of the Constitution (see Sect. 2.1.2). A careful
review of Part II of the Constitution reveals that such restrictions or limitations can
also be contained in legislation within the limits of the Constitution itself,55 as
introduced by the House of Representatives or ‘deemed to be part of Cypriot law
under Art. 188 of the Constitution’56 or deriving from EU law,57 subject to the
50 See Mesaritou v. The Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation [1972] 3 CLR 100; Theodorides v.
Plousiou [1976] 3 CLR 319.
51 Emilianides 2013, p. 44.
52 Ibid., p. 53. See Sect. 1.1.2 of this Report. See also Loizou (2001) (in Greek).
53 Emilianides 2013, p. 53.
54 Fina (Cyprus) Ltd v. The Republic [1962] 3 RSCC 26; see Emilianides 2013, p. 146.
55 E.g. more recently President of the Republic v. House of Representatives [2000] 3 CLR 238 (in
Greek).
56 Police v. Hondrou and Another [1962] 3 RSCC 82.
57 See Emilianides 2013, p. 146.
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general principles inter alia of reasonableness and proportionality. Article 33(2) of
the Constitution expressly provides that such restrictions or limitations must be
interpreted strictly and cannot be applied ‘for any purpose other than those for
which they have been prescribed’, thereby providing a general framework of
necessity and/or proportionality to the restriction/limitation to constitutionally
safeguarded fundamental rights. This provision of the Constitution must be read in
conjunction with Art. 35 of the Constitution, which casts a vertical duty on the state
and its various branches of government (within the limits of their respective
competence) to ensure the efﬁcient application of Part II of the Constitution vis-à-
vis the beneﬁciaries of these fundamental rights.
Additionally, it should be noted that the fundamental rights safeguarded under
the Constitution are minimum rights. Rights may be further protected or new rights
may be established through legislation, in which case these are not protected as
constitutional rights but as ordinary rights.58 This last point may have direct
implications for the protection afforded to rights deriving from EU law and their
implementation in the national legal order.
While EU law (all provisions) should take precedence over conflicting consti-
tutional provisions as a result of Art. 1A of the Constitution, the use of the EU
Charter by the Supreme Court in its case law is far less developed than the (much
older) use of the ECHR. This could perhaps also be explained by looking at the
overall practice of the supremacy of EU law by the courts in Cyprus, especially by
the Supreme Court. It could be said that despite the reference to Art. 1A in Art.
179 of the Constitution and because the Constitution in Cyprus still provides
expressly for its own supremacy, considerations of EU law and the exercise of
judicial review arising as a result of the application of EU law in Cyprus appear
prima facie to be encompassed within the fabric of the Constitution. This may be
the subject of some academic debate in Cyprus,59 but in judicial and/or practical
terms, the overall approach of the Supreme Court can be described as inconsistent
and as sometimes ignoring EU law (or even the ECHR) to concentrate merely on
the protection of fundamental rights in accordance with express constitutional
provisions.60
58 Emilianides 2013, p. 146.
59 Emilianides argues that EU and EC law are considered an integral part of the Constitution,
Emilianides 2013, p. 54; contra Kombos & Pantazi 2012, p. 309: ‘the hierarchical rule resulting
from Art. 179 does not apply to EU law’; see also Lycourgos 2010, p. 101. For a detailed analysis,
see also Laulhé Shaelou 2010a, pp. 133–40 who concludes: ‘The legislative objective of removing
the potential conflict between EC/EU law and the Constitution appears a priori achieved; it will
however no doubt face the judicial scrutiny of the Cypriot courts through cases on the enforcement
of Community law rights in Cyprus’, p. 139.
60 Interview with Dr. Demetrios Hadjihambis, former President of the Supreme Court of Cyprus
(June 2013–July 2014) and judge at the Supreme Court (1999–2013), 9 January 2015.
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Some of the wide-ranging areas where the Ombudsman of Cyprus and equality
bodies in Cyprus have pointed out that national law needs to better ensure funda-
mental freedoms and the principle of non-discrimination arising from EU law
include e.g. the right of entry and residence for same-sex partners and/or the third
country national spouse of an EU citizen, the free movement of workers, social
assistance, and detention or expulsion orders of EU nationals.61 The courts in
particular would need to revise their role and adopt a more teleological or holistic
approach, as legal actions brought before them normally fall within the (narrow)
ambit of the judicial control of administrative acts under Art. 146 of the
Constitution and do not entail any balancing exercise established within the fabric
of the Constitution for the protection of constitutionally safeguarded fundamental
rights.62
In general, the protection of constitutionally safeguarded fundamental rights in
the Cypriot legal order, whether ‘classic’ fundamental rights, economic or social
rights, has always been at the core of the case law of the Cypriot courts, inde-
pendently of the supremacy of EU law. As such, the balancing of fundamental
rights with economic rights can be said to amount to a ‘routine’ exercise for the
Cypriot courts within the fabric of the Constitution, to which EU law ‘merely’
added one more – albeit fundamental in nature – dimension, thereby increasing the
likelihood of constitutional issues arising. Whereas a full and comprehensive
review of the balancing exercise between these rights within the fabric of the
Constitution would be beyond the scope of this Report and has been explored
elsewhere,63 drawing general trends could prove useful. The balancing exercise
usually involves a strict (but careful and delicate) construction of the restrictions/
limitations to such rights on the basis of Arts. 33 and 35 of the Constitution and/or
in accordance with the case law of the ECHR (in the case of a collision of classic
rights).64 It is also useful to mention that the collision between social rights ‘per se’,
especially within the framework of the freedom of movement that is so central to
the case law of the CJEU, and the right to strike, have not arisen as such in the
Cypriot legal order.65 This could however be an area of potential conflict between
the Cypriot and the EU legal orders given the attachment to social rights of the
61 See in particular Trimikliniotis 2013 for a review of recent domestic case law related to these
issues, pp. 121–140.
62 Administrative recourses under Art. 146 fall under the exclusive revisional jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, both ﬁrst instance and appellate, are strictly limited to the review of the legality of
an administrative act, decision or omission, and exclude any review of the case on the merits. See
Emilianides 2013, p. 197.
63 For a detailed review of the collision between classic rights and/or socio-economic and cultural
rights, including within these sub-categories of rights, see Kombos and Pantazi 2012, pp. 338–46.
For a thorough consideration of the balancing exercise between economic freedoms and funda-
mental rights in the European public order with an emphasis on Cyprus, see Laulhé Shaelou 2011.
64 Kombos and Pantazi 2012, p. 344.
65 Kombos and Pantazi 2012, p. 343.
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former66 and to free movement of the latter.67 It has been suggested that the overall
balancing exercise currently taking place in the Cypriot legal order, whereby the
Supreme Court ‘advances its own perception’ in the event that the standard of
protection granted under the ECHR is lower, usually in the absence of any
meaningful consideration of the case law of the CJEU, may have to change in the
future, especially with respect to potential clashes between social rights and free
movement. This could result in the ‘lowering’ or at least ‘alteration’ of the standard
of protection offered to social rights in the Cypriot Constitution, with a special
reference to the right to strike.68 In the meantime and until such a conflict arises,
what could be said is that the test to be satisﬁed for the protection of social rights
‘within the framework of the public interest and common good’ could end up in
effect being higher than for other constitutionally protected fundamental rights. This
would seem to be conﬁrmed by the recent case law of the Supreme Court of Cyprus
related to austerity measures put in place in response to the sovereign debt crisis.
For example, the case of Georgos Charalambos and others v. Republic of
Cyprus69 concerned a number of recourses brought before the Supreme Court by a
number of civil servants against the Republic, the Ministry of Finance and the
General Auditor, with respect to the law for the special levy on the pensions and
gross salaries of ofﬁcers and employees in the public sector as well as the pensions of
retired persons (Law 112(I)/2011 as amended). The case was brought on the basis of
Arts. 23, 24, 26, 28 and 146, but not Art. 9 of the Constitution (right to a decent
existence and social security) which can be considered as requiring on a case-by-case
basis a higher burden of proof to rebut the presumption of constitutionality afforded
to legislation (on the basis of proportionality), including apparently in times of
economic crisis. With respect to the combined principles of equal treatment and
equality in taxation (Arts. 28 and 24 respectively), the Supreme Court conﬁrmed its
previous case law by stating that the principle of equality must be balanced with the
economic situation and ﬁscal policy in place at the time, and that the state has the
discretion in ‘times of extreme economic crisis’ to take measures targeting speciﬁc
groups of the population ‘without necessarily violating the principle of equal
treatment’.70 Adopting a comparative approach and after examining the legal
framework put in place in Cyprus with respect to the special levy (including for the
private sector), the Supreme Court subsequently ruled that there had been no breach
66 In Apostolides Georghios & Others v. the Republic of Cyprus through the Ministry of Labour
and Social Insurance & Others [1982] 3 CLR 928, the Supreme Court ruled that social rights are
on an equal footing with political rights but that the economic situation and capacity of the country
must be taken into account when assessing compliance of a measure with Art. 9 of the Constitution
(right to a decent existence and social security); see Kombos and Pantazi 2012, pp. 314–315.
67 Ibid. See also the analysis of the dissenting opinion of Judge Erotokritou in the case of Myrto
Christodoulou in Sect. 2.7.3 of this Report.
68 Kombos and Pantazi 2012, p. 345.
69 Cases No. 1480-4/2011, 1591/2011 and 1625/2011, 11 June 2014 (majority decision) (in
Greek).
70 Translation by the author.
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of the principle of equal treatment and that the measures put in place (‘in coordi-
nation with the competent organs of the EU’) could not be deemed ‘extreme’ and
thus disproportionate (proportionality was raised with respect to the right to prop-
erty), given the economic situation in which Cyprus found itself.
This judgment should be contrasted with the case ofMaria Koutselini-Ioannidou
and others v. The Republic,71 with respect to the reduction of pensions of retired civil
servants and public ofﬁcers who have been re-employed in the public sector based on
Law 88(I)/2011, which was deemed unconstitutional on the basis of Art. 23 of the
Constitution, independently of the current economic climate and/or any obligations
as may arise under EU membership and/or the ECHR. In this majority decision, the
Supreme Court distinguished this case from the previous one on the basis that
pensions are a property right which cannot be limited in the name of the public
interest on the basis of Art. 23. In the second judgment in the case, however, Judge
Michaelidou referred to the expression of the general concept of public interest,
included in Art. 23 under the form of public beneﬁt, and to the need to justify it.72
In a wider framework, it should be briefly noted that the right to free movement
and residence on the territory of the Republic of Cyprus73 arguably holds a strategic
place in the Constitution, between the right of the accused and the ‘no-exile’ rule. It
should therefore be regarded as a basic fundamental right in the Cypriot legal order
and any restriction/limitation to this right should be interpreted strictly (the grounds
are contained in the provision itself). To this consideration could be added the case
law on shopping hours within the framework of Art. 25 of the Constitution (the
right to work) where there has been an uneasy relationship between working
conditions and open and fair competition in the name of the general public inter-
est,74 including post-EU accession.75 It is undeniable, however, that there have been
overall some gradual adjustments in the balancing of fundamental rights with
economic free movement rights or associated/flanking policies, in the name of EU
law and/or in favour of economic freedoms falling within the scope of EU law.76
An example of this would be the (unanimous) decision in a reference to the
Supreme Court77 in relation to the law amending the law on the protection of
beaches and transposing the Services Directive, analysed earlier in Sect. 2.1. As
71 Joined Cases No. 740/2011-587/2012, 7 October 2014 (majority decision) (in Greek).
72 In this respect, see speech by Judge Myron M. Nicolatos.
73 Article 13 of the Constitution.
74 See Georgoulla Georgiou et al v. the Police [1999] 2 CLR 616 (in Greek) and Andronikos
Vasiliadies Ltd et al v. the Police (2001) 2 CLR 715 (in Greek).
75 A power struggle involving the various branches of government of the Republic of Cyprus has
been ongoing for the past few years, with no ultimate outcome yet, as to who has the power to
regulate shopping days/hours and related working conditions, and on what constitutional basis/
principle. Overall it would appear that the economic situation of the island prevails over any
consideration of EU law.
76 Dr. Hadjihambis, interview 9 January 2015.
77 President of the Republic v. House of Representatives, Reference 2/2013, 9 May 2014 (in
Greek).
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seen, the national Law gave priority to the owners or operators of a seaside hotel or
recreational business in relation to the tender procedure for leasing the relevant part
of the beach. The lawyers of the House of Representatives justiﬁed this policy by
the general public interest as an exception to the selection process, including under
Art. 12(3) of the Directive (applicable ‘where the number of authorisations avail-
able for an activity is limited because of scarcity of natural resources or technical
capacity’) and on the basis of Art. 25 of the Constitution. These arguments were
rejected by the Supreme Court not only on the basis of the Directive’s requirement
that the licensing system should not be discriminatory and disproportionate, but
also on the basis that the principles of free competition, as set out in EU law and in
the Directive, should prevail.78
On a further point, the Court noted that there was no breach of the principle of
legitimate expectations since the House of Representatives, in addition to not
meeting the deadline for transposition of the Directive at the end of 2012, had
through the amending law extended the existing situation until the end of October
2014, thereby giving ample time to all concerned to comply.79
2.3 Constitutional Rights, the European Arrest Warrant
and EU Criminal Law
Introduction and constitutional amendments The European Arrest Warrant
(EAW) Framework Decision (FD) was implemented in Cyprus by Law
No. 133(I)/2004 on the European Arrest Warrant and the Surrender Procedures
of Requested Persons, which has since been amended three times.80 There were
initial difﬁculties in some Member States with the very idea of surrendering their
own nationals based on the principle of mutual recognition, including in Cyprus
where ‘expelling or extraditing’ procedures were interpreted as being expressly
limited to aliens under Art. 11(2)(f) of the Constitution.81 This difﬁculty persisted
following EU accession and the matter was brought before the full bench of the
Supreme Court of Cyprus in November 2005.82 The Court had to consider the
78 Ibid., p. 12.
79 Ibid., p. 14.
80 Consolidated version available at http://www.cylaw.org/nomoi/enop/non-ind/2004_1_133/full.
html (in Greek).
81 See Attorney General v. Afamis, n. 25. An unofﬁcial translation of Art. 11(2)(f) in force until the
2006 amendment is available in English at http://www.law.uj.edu.pl/*kpk/eaw/other/220_EAW.
pdf, p. 170. See also case note by Tsadiras 2007, p. 1516.
82 Attorney General v. Constantinou [2005] 1 CLR 1356, [2007] 3 CMLR 42; see Tsadiras 2007
and Laulhé Shaelou 2010a, pp. 134–137. See also http://www.supremecourt.gov.cy/Judicial/SC.
nsf/All/1F76458C67091E86C2257348004BC6B6?OpenDocument and http://www.law.uj.edu.pl/
*kpk/eaw/judicial_decisions/Cyprus_Constitutional_Court.pdf.
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implementation of the FD in the national legal order and the compatibility of the
implementing law with the Constitution.83 The Court took the view that Art. 11 of
the Constitution provided an exhaustive list of the reasons why a person could be
arrested and it did not provide for the execution of an EAW.84 It then reiterated its
jurisprudence on the prohibition of the extradition of Cypriot nationals,85 referred to
the Pupino case86 and to the lack of direct effect of the FD, and ruled as a result that
it was left to its own discretion to interpret national law in this ﬁeld in accordance
with the FD. On this point, it decided that the implementing law was contrary to
Art. 11 of the Constitution, as no provision in the implementing law could be
interpreted ‘in such a way so as to prevail and to be applied as regards the nationals
of the Republic’.87 This judicial decision triggered (indirectly) a legislative reaction
and provided the necessary impetus to proceed with long-awaited amendments to
the Constitution to reflect EU membership obligations, including with respect to
Art. 11.88 Following the 2006 amendment to the Constitution (the Fifth
Amendment, see Sect. 1.2), the arrest and detention of a Cypriot national for the
purpose of extradition to another EU Member State was made possible, provided
that it related to offences committed after Cyprus became an EU Member State on 1
May 2004 (Art. 11(2)(f), sub-para. 1) and that such request was not motivated by
grounds such as race, religion, ethnic origin or political opinion (sub-para. 3).89
83 For the constitutional implications of this case in the Cypriot legal order, see Sect. 1.2.
84 Laulhé Shaelou 2010a, p. 136.
85 Georgiou v. Director of Central Prisons [1991] 1 CLR 814.
86 Case C-105/03 Pupino [2005] ECR I-05285.
87 Constantinou, para. 24. Translation by the author.
88 See Sect. 1.2. See also Laulhé Shaelou 2010a, pp. 137–138, and Gorski & Hofmanski 2008.
89 Sub-paragraph (f) of Art. 11(2) was substituted with the following:
‘(f) the arrest or detention of a person … or of an alien against whom action is being taken
with a view to deportation or extradition or of a national of the Republic with a view to
extraditing or surrendering him, subject to the following provisions:
(i) the arrest or detention of a national of the Republic for the purpose of surrendering him
under a European arrest warrant is possible solely in relation to events that occurred or acts
done subsequent to the date of accession of the Republic to the European Union.
(ii) the arrest or detention of a national of the Republic for the purpose of extraditing or
surrendering him pursuant to an international agreement binding the Republic is possible
solely in relation to events that occurred or acts done subsequent to the publication of the
Fifth Amendment of the Constitution Law of 2006.
(iii) the arrest or detention of any person for the purpose of extraditing or surrendering him
pursuant to an international agreement is not possible if the competent body or authority
under the law, has substantial grounds for believing that a request for extradition or sur-
render has been made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on grounds of
his race, religion, ethnic or ethnotic origin, political opinion, or of any legal claims of
collective or individual rights in accordance with international law.’
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At the same time, Art. 7 of Law 133(I)/2004 was also amended to provide that a
request for the issuing of an EAW for the purpose of criminal prosecution must be
accompanied by the written approval of the Attorney General of the Republic of
Cyprus (who is responsible for criminal proceedings in the territory of the Republic
in accordance with Art. 113(2) of the Constitution).90 Following these amendments,
the legal framework of the EAW in Cyprus remained prime facie incompatible with
the FD, to the extent that it set out additional requirements/limitations to the issuing
and execution of an EAW, provided for additional protection of fundamental human
rights not expressly provided in the FD and, as such, potentially affected the
principle of mutual recognition and/or the rights of suspects and defendants.91
In 2013 Cyprus proceeded with a further amendment to its Constitution, allegedly
to ‘fully comply’ with its obligations arising from the EAW FD.92 The amendment
was related to the pending extradition proceedings that were examined by the
Supreme Court in Dinos Michailides v. Attorney General.93 This case was an appeal
and concerned a Cypriot citizen against whom a ﬁrst EAWhad been issued in 2013 by
the Greek authorities who requested the surrender for purposes of criminal prose-
cution for money laundering. It should be noted that the prosecution related to events
that took place between 1997 and 2001, and that Art. 11 of the Constitution as
amended by the Fifth Constitutional Amendment allowed the extradition of Cypriot
citizens only for events that took place after accession to the EU in 2004. Article 11(2)
(f) was thus further amended in order to allow the extradition of Cypriot citizens in
connection to events that took place at any time, even before accession to the EU.94All
90 Amending law 112(I) of 2006, available at http://www.cylaw.org/nomoi/arith/2006_1_112.pdf
(in Greek).
91 See DG Internal Policies of the Union, Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs (2009)
‘Implementation of the European Arrest Warrant and joint investigation teams at EU and national
level’ available at http://www.eipa.eu/ﬁles/EUROPEANARRESTWARRANT.pdf 3, pp. 11–12,
p. 14 and pp. 18–19; see also Kapardis 2008, pp. 12–23 and http://www.law.uj.edu.pl/*kpk/eaw/
data/cyprus.html.
92 Seventh Amendment to the Constitution Law 68(I)/2013, available in English at: http://www.
olc.gov.cy/olc/olc.nsf/all/DA5878C1FB78D167C2257C16002284F7/$ﬁle/The%20Seventh%
20Amendment%20of%20the%20Constitution%20Law%20of%202013.pdf?openelement.pdf.
93 Dinos Michailides v. Attorney General, Case 221/13, 2 September 2013.
94 The sub-paragraph (f) in Art. 11 was replaced as follows:
‘(f) … the arrest or detention of an alien against whom action is being taken with a view to
deportation or extradition or the detention of a national of the Republic with a view to
extraditing or surrendering him pursuant to a European arrest warrant or pursuant to an
international treaty binding on the Republic, on condition that such treaty is applied by the
other party thereto. However, the arrest or detention of any person for the purpose of
extraditing or surrendering him is not possible if the competent body or authority under the
law has substantial grounds for believing that a request for extradition or surrender has been
made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on the grounds of his race,
religion, nationality, ethnic origin, political opinion, or of any legal claims of collective or
individual rights in accordance with international law.’
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sub-paragraphs were deleted and time limitations were removed.95 The guarantee of
non-discrimination on grounds of race, religion and other grounds was clearly reit-
erated and now applies to all persons subject to extradition or surrender procedures,
whether nationals of the Republic or not, and whether the subjects of a European or an
international arrest warrant. This Seventh Amendment to the Constitution with
respect to the surrender of Cypriot nationals was welcomed by the Supreme Court of
Cyprus in its recent case law as necessary for the Republic to fully abide by its
obligations under the FD.96
2.3.1 The Presumption of Innocence
2.3.1.1 The legal maxim of nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege is a fundamental
principle of Cypriot criminal law embodied in Art. 12(1) of the Constitution, which
provides that
[n]o person shall be held guilty of any offence on account of any act or omission which did
not constitute an offence under the law at the time when it was committed; and no person
shall have a heavier punishment imposed on him for an offence other than that expressly
provided for it by law at the time when it was committed.
It was on the basis of the principle of the non-retroactivity of criminal law deriving
from this provision that the Republic had sought inter alia to limit the scope of
application of the EAW in Cyprus to suspected offences committed post EU
accession (in the Fifth Amendment). This concern, however, appeared unfounded
for procedural law and was accordingly removed with the Seventh Amendment to
the Constitution. Article 12(2) of the Constitution also sets out the rule against
double penalty (ne bis in idem): ‘a person who has been acquitted or convicted of an
offence shall not be tried again for the same offence. No person shall be punished
twice for the same act or omission except where death ensues from such act or
omission’. This is a constitutional right that even precedes the birth of the Republic,
without deviations, even in the name of public security.97 There is also a guarantee
in the Constitution against arbitrary punishment (Art. 12(3)) as well as against
general conﬁscation of property (Art. 12(6)).98
The presumption of innocence also features in Art. 12(4) of the Constitution. It
provides that ‘every person charged with an offence shall be presumed innocent
95 Cyprus had been criticised for having introduced such time restraints. See Christou 2012, p. 63
and fn. 31 in particular.
96 See Dinos Michailides v. Attorney General of the Republic, Civil Appeal 221/13, 2/9/2013.
97 Paraskeva 2015, p. 185. In the context of the EAW, see District Court of Larnaka, Case No. 2/
06, based on Law 133(I)/2004 and concerning the execution of an EAW against Vakhtang
Obolashvili, 4 May 2005, where the District Judge refused to execute the EAW against the
requested person based on the principle of double jeopardy (developed below).
98 For a general consideration of the rights of the accused, with respect in particular to Arts. 11 and
12 of the Constitution, see Emilianides 2013, pp. 157–159; see also Paraskeva 2015, pp. 176–220.
On the rights of suspects of criminal offences, see also Stefanou 2011.
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until proved guilty according to law’. This is a constitutional right without quali-
ﬁcation, constitutes a human right and, in the context of procedural law, applies all
throughout the process – before, during and until the ﬁnal conviction of the
accused. It is important to note that this right is afforded to all, whether nationals or
aliens. It lies entirely in the hands of the judiciary to determine whether a criminal
offence has been committed by a person, provided the prosecution can prove so
beyond all reasonable doubt.99 This means in particular that no public authority can
speculate on the guilt of a person before he/she has been convicted by a competent
court. Thus, it was held that administrative decisions attributing criminal acts to a
person were in violation of the constitutional presumption of innocence and, as
such, unconstitutional.100 It should also be noted that the presumption of innocence
in Cypriot constitutional law also implies that the accused has a right to silence and
against self-incrimination.101 Exercising these rights, which are ancillary to the
presumption of innocence, does not mean admitting guilt.102
The absolute protection afforded to the presumption of innocence by the
Constitution raises interesting questions in the context of the EAW and mutual
recognition, with respect in particular to the authorities involved, the procedure and
the nature of the arrest warrant. Following the Seventh Amendment to the
Constitution, Art. 11(3) now provides that ‘save when and as provided by law in
case of a flagrant offence punishable with death or imprisonment’, a person can
only be arrested under the authority of a reasoned judicial warrant issued according
to the formalities prescribed by the law or pursuant to an EAW (the latter reference
to the EAW having been added by the Seventh Amendment). The police cannot
therefore proceed with the arrest of a person without the issue of a judicial warrant/
EAW and its communication to the relevant authorities of the Republic. The central
authority for the issue and execution of EAWs in Cyprus is the Ministry of Justice
and Public Order, i.e. an executive organ of the state, although other key actors such
as the police force, the Law Ofﬁce of the Republic and District Judges are also
involved in the process.103 The competence of the central authorities in other
Member States was challenged before the courts in Cyprus in relation to the exe-
cution of EAWs, but in vain. The case of Igor Ovakimyan v. Attorney General of
the Republic concerned the execution in Cyprus of an EAW issued by the Dutch
Central Authority. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Limassol District
Court to execute the EAW against the appellant and ruled that the Central Authority
99 Rex v. Mentesh 14 CLR 233; Police v. Chrysanthou 15 CLR 50 and Costis Panayi Kefalos v.
The Queen 19 CLR 121. For the reversal of the burden of proof in Cyprus law in speciﬁc
instances, see Paraskeva 2015, pp. 197–198 and in particular fn. 790 and 792.
100 Kyriakides v. The Republic [1997] 3 CLR 485 (in Greek). See Emilianides 2013, pp. 158–159.
101 President of the Republic v. House of Representatives [1994] 3 CLR 1 (in Greek). See
Emilianides 2013, p. 158; see also Paraskeva 2015, pp. 201–202.
102 Charalambous v. The Republic [1985] 2 CLR 40; Emilianides 2013, p. 158.
103 See http://www.police.gov.cy/police/police.nsf/All/367B2EB11E7D96B9C2257A1E002E2E17?
OpenDocument.
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can also be a public prosecutor or other judicial body as determined by the legal
system of each state. In the Netherlands, as the Cypriot Supreme Court noted,
despite being assigned to the Ministry of Justice, the public prosecution service
belonged to the judiciary branch of government.104 This was repeated in Eva
Karina Andersson v. Attorney General of the Republic in the context of the exe-
cution of an EAW from Sweden.105 It appears to be in line with the jurisprudence of
the ECtHR on the nature of the ‘court’ as an independent organ from the executive
power.106 Thus, the essence of the matter seems to be that the EAW must remain in
effect a ‘judicial decision’,107 independent from the executive. This does not seem
to be exactly the case in Cyprus108 or at least was arguably not the case until 2014.
In Cyprus, once a request is transmitted to the Central Authority, it is commu-
nicated to the Attorney General who is also not a judicial authority, but an inde-
pendent ofﬁcer of the Republic (Arts. 112–114 of the Constitution). The latter is
said to perform a ‘double-check’ to the extent that the police ﬁrst ‘presents the case’
and subsequently a draft of the EAW for approval by the Attorney General. This
administrative/technical process, prior to the judicial decision being taken, has been
criticised in evaluation reports as being at the very least unnecessary and perhaps
more seriously in violation of the principle of mutual recognition and/or the spirit of
the FD, to the extent in particular that it could constitute an obstacle to a request
reaching the District Court in Cyprus.109 Furthermore, it should be noted that while
the Attorney General performed its double check, the Central Authority would until
2014 scrutinise the EAW in terms of formalities but also substance, with the pos-
sibility to request further information or a re-issue of the EAW by the issuing state.
It was only following this screening procedure that the Central Authority would
proceed with issuing a certiﬁcate under Sect. 16(1) of the implementing law and
transmit it to the judge who would decide under Sect. 16(2) on the issue of an arrest
warrant under the implementing law. As ably noted by Christou, this certiﬁcate
constituted no guarantee that the EAW would not be ‘challenged before the courts’,
since the Central Authority is not a judicial authority either, thereby begging the
question of the real judicial nature of the EAW and of the scope of the principle of
mutual recognition in Cyprus.
The role of the Ministry and the Attorney General in the issue/execution of
EAWs recently led for the ﬁrst time to legal issues raised in the case of Mr. Louka
in the context of an international arrest warrant from South Africa; the details will
be provided in Sect. 3.6. This case entitles one to wonder whether considerations
regarding extradition decisions based on political discretion could arise in the
104 [2005] 1 CLR 1119.
105 [2008] 1 CLR 1092. See Christou 2012, p. 64 and fn. 50.
106 Hutchison Reid v. the United Kingdom, no. 50272/99, § 64, ECHR 2003-IV.
107 See Art. 7(2) of the FD.
108 See http://www.eipa.eu/ﬁles/EUROPEANARRESTWARRANT.pdf, p. 11.
109 Christou 2012, pp. 64–65.
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European context and what safeguards are available in the law to avoid potentially
arbitrary results.110
It should be said from the outset that the legal framework surrounding inter-
national arrest warrants and EAWs certainly differs with respect to their spirit,
scope, powers and processes.111 With respect to the legal basis of an arrest warrant,
the Supreme Court in Scattergood had clariﬁed the judicial character of an arrest
warrant issued under the law implementing the EAW FD (as opposed to an arrest
warrant issued in other extradition procedures) and that the basis for such arrest
warrant was the law implementing the FD (Sects. 3 and 18) and not domestic
law.112 The Court subsequently stated that a warrant issued on the basis of Art.
16 of the implementing law was a ‘preliminary measure’ which aimed at ensuring
the arrest of the suspected offender, in order to then decide during the course of the
procedure ‘whether the execution of the EAW should be allowed’.113 This was
quite an ambiguous statement which appears to reveal that the execution of an
EAW did not occur ‘as if it were issued by the issuing state’s own authorities’,114 as
requested by the principle of mutual recognition. More recently, however, and
within the context of the amendments to the law implementing the EAW FD in
Cyprus,115 the Supreme Court, referring to the case law of the ECJ,116 clearly stated
that there is an ‘express obligation’ to execute ‘every’ EAW in accordance with Art.
1(2) of the FD and this obligation is without exception outside of the framework
provided in the FD (Arts. 3 and 4) and in the implementing law (Sects. 13 and 14)
(see below).117
It therefore appeared that, at least until 2014, there were some weaknesses (i.e.
extra scrutiny even where it may have favoured the defendant’s rights) in the law
implementing the EAW FD in Cyprus, with some of them also identiﬁed with
respect to international arrest warrants. The House of Representatives passed two
amending laws to the implementing law in 2014, one in early 2014 where
110 For equivalent considerations arising (indirectly) from unsuccessful pleas by the lawyers of
Dinos Michailides subject to an EAW issued by the Greek authorities, see Dinos Michailides v.
Attorney General of the Republic, Civil Appeal 221/13, 2/9/2013.
111 As noted by the Supreme Court itself in Scattergood v. Attorney General [2005] 1 CLR 142 (in
Greek), the EAW procedure is a ‘relative’ of the extradition procedure under the relevant domestic
law but as such, ‘does not stop being different, based on another law enacted within the framework
of the EU accession’ (translation by the author).
112 Ibid.
113 Ibid.
114 Christou 2012, p. 65.
115 Amending Law 30(I)/2014 was published in the Ofﬁcial Gazette of the Republic on 7 March
2014 and Amending Law 183(I)/2014 on 12 December 2014.
116 Case C-388/08 PPU Laymann and Pustovarov [2008] ECR I-08993, para. 51; Case C-261/09
Mantello [2010] ECR I-11477, para. 36.
117 Civil Appeal No 184/2014, Hadwen James v. Attorney General, 17 July 2014; for a more
flexible approach, see Civil Appeal No. 41/14, Attorney General v. Mrukwa, 5 March 2014; see
also n. 127 below.
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signiﬁcant amendments were made to a number of provisions of the law,118 and
again in late 2014 where one additional amendment was made to the rights of the
person subject to the EAW.119 Through the ﬁrst amending law, the power given to
the Central Authority (CA) to scrutinise the EAW and issue a certiﬁcate of com-
pliance under Art. 16 para. 1 was revoked, and the CA was merely left with the
obligation to ensure the arrest of the person subject to the EAW; there is only
mention of the power of the judge to proceed with the issue of a temporary arrest
warrant in the case of an emergency and on the basis of an EAW or before the issue
or the transmission of an EAW, following receipt of such a request through
EUROPOL or otherwise (new para. 2). The detention time under the temporary
arrest warrant was also extended from three to eight days (Art. 16(3)). Amending
Law 30(I)/2014 also removed the reference to ‘criminal proceedings’ in Sect. 3 of
the implementing law, thereby arguably enhancing judicial pre-trial and procedural
powers.
The above changes appear to reconcile the implementing law with the spirit and
provisions of the FD as well as the principle of mutual recognition. It remains,
however, to be seen what the impact of the amendments to Sect. 16 of the
implementing law will mean in terms of safeguards, including for the respect of the
rights of suspects, the protection of the presumption of innocence and of other
fundamental human rights/principles embodied in procedural guarantees. In addi-
tion to constitutional safeguards in each country, the protection of fundamental
rights is also part of the principle of mutual recognition itself,120 thereby arguably
implying the exercise of a certain level of control by the competent authorities.121 It
should not mean, however, that the protection of fundamental rights can constitute
an autonomous ground of refusal to execute an EAW. This was conﬁrmed recently
by the Supreme Court of Cyprus with respect to the EU Charter, in the case of
James Hadwen,122 with the Court noting that such arguments do not ‘ﬁt’ within the
‘speciﬁc procedure’ of the execution of EAWs by District Courts (which the Court
classiﬁed as sui generis).123
2.3.1.2 Until at least 2014, however, the authorities in Cyprus, and in particular the
District Judges, would not ‘automatically authorise extradition with minimum
formality and no consideration of evidence’ (cf. the Questionnaire). The courts
118 Law 30(I)/2014, 7.3.2014.
119 Law 183(I)/2014, 12.12.2014.
120 For Cyprus, see Sect. 2(2) of the implementing law: ‘The application of the provisions of the
present Law cannot result in the violation of the obligation of respect of the fundamental rights and
principles, in accordance with Art. 6 TEU. In any case, the requested person shall not be trans-
ferred to a country where he/she would be at serious risk of being subjected to the death penalty or
subjected to torture or other inhuman or humiliating or treatment’ (translation by the author).
121 Christou et al. 2009, p. 113.
122 See n. 117 above.
123 Ibid.; see also Dinos. Michailides v. Attorney General, Civil Appeal No. 221/13, 2 September
2013.
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proceeded with the review of pre-trial evidence to determine in particular the
seriousness of the offence,124 the time frame and the situation of the person, inter
alia whether the person subject to the EAW was more ‘at risk’ if extradited to the
issuing country rather than remaining under arrest and/or in detention in Cyprus.
Overall, the courts proceeded on the assumption that there was ‘reasonable suspi-
cion’ against the suspected person as evidenced by the EAW, which, however, had
to be investigated and determined by the District Judge, with a view to arresting
and/or detaining the person subject to the EAW. This is quite clearly expressed in
the implementing law where it transpires that even after a suspected person is
brought before the District Judge, extradition is still only a ‘possibility’ (Sect. 17
(1)) whereas his/her detention needs to be decided by the judge (Sect. 18(1)). Most
of the time, however, an EAW is issued and/or executed,125 with one commentator
noting with respect to the role of the judge that judges need to ‘be moved’ by the
parties, which is a characteristic of the common law tradition, as opposed to the
civil law system where the role of the judge is more inquisitorial.126 The Supreme
Court of Cyprus has, however, recently expressed in rather strict terms the obli-
gation on the District Courts to proceed with the execution of EAWs and appears to
have framed the protection of fundamental rights (exclusively) within procedural
guarantees as provided in the FD and the implementing law subject to a propor-
tionality test, thereby potentially adopting a stricter reading than some District
Judges on a case-by-case basis.127
124 See e.g. Civil Appeal, Panayiotis Philippou (no. 2) [2009] 1 CLR 693.
125 The latest public statistics available date back from 2010 when 34 EAWs were issued to
Cyprus. The statistics of the Ministry of Justice do not specify how many EAWs were actually
executed. The annual report only mentions that these EAWs were transmitted to the judicial
authorities of the Republic for execution. It then states under the title ‘transfer of sentenced
persons’ that 13 requests were received by the Ministry, out of which 11 culminated in extradition
from or to Cyprus; see http://www.mjpo.gov.cy/mjpo/MJPO.nsf/All/88FC4FA80EAFB52A
C22579BC003005DE/$ﬁle/etisia%202010%20-%20ﬁnal.pdf, p. 37.
126 Christou 2012, p. 66.
127 This does or does not beneﬁt the person subject to the EAW. In James Hadwen (see n. 117
above), the Supreme Court acting as an appeal court, upheld the ﬁndings of the trial court to the
extent that it had allowed a request for adjournment in order to call an expert witness from Malta to
testify that the offence for which he was arrested was time-barred but refused to grant a second
adjournment, noting that the execution of an EAW must occur within a strict time frame. The fact
that in the application of Sect. 15(2) of the implementing law, the trial court omitted to hear the
appellant was not sufﬁcient to render the decision of the District Court to execute the EAW invalid.
In Mrukwa (see n. 117 above), the District Judge had refused to execute an EAW issued by the
Polish authorities on the basis of delays in justice both in Poland and in Cyprus, and lack of
justiﬁcation, and referred to Sects. 2(2) and 4(1)(f) and/or (g) of the implementing law. In the
appeal case, the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the trial court and conﬁrmed that even
though the implementing law does not provide for the refusal to execute an EAW on the basis of
the timely administration of justice, account should be taken of Sect. 2(2) of the implementing law
(and not of the Constitution, as stated by the District Court) which, in conjunction with Art. 6 TEU
and the principle of mutual recognition, should ensure the protection of fundamental rights by the
authorities of the issuing Member State.
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2.3.2 Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege
2.3.2.1 The legal maxim of nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege was already dis-
cussed in Sect. 2.3.1.1 above in the context of constitutional rights.128 It was also
said that there is an express human right ground to reject requests for surrender of
suspects in the implementing law, the scope of which, however, remains unclear. In
line with the FD, the implementing law also includes a list of 32 offences in Sect. 12
(2) which do not require the double criminality principle to be satisﬁed, provided that
the offences are punishable by a custodial sentence or detention order of a maximum
period of at least three years in the law of the issuing state (verbatim transposition of
Art. 2(2) of the FD). This list remains unamended to date and the section has been
described as helping to serve ‘substantial justice’ by preventing suspects from
escaping from justice on procedural grounds.129 Despite controversies deriving from
the abolition of double criminality, it has been seen as creating a ‘better balance
between private individuals and national interest in enforcing the law’.130
The above provision must be read in conjunction with Sect. 13 of the imple-
menting law where the grounds for mandatory non-execution of an EAW are set
out, including some not expressly provided in Art. 3 of the FD (amnesty, ne bis in
idem, and lack of criminal responsibility due to age).131 It is worth noting that
Sect.13 of the implementing law was amended in 2014, but only with respect to the
phrasing of sub-para. (d) which reflects Art. 11(2)(f) of the Constitution sub-para. 3,
as amended. The two other grounds remain unaffected, namely that the Republic
will refuse to execute the EAW in two situations. First, if a person subject to an
EAW for the execution of a custodial sentence or detention order is a Cypriot
citizen, the Republic will execute the sentence or detention order according to its
own criminal laws. Secondly, if a person subject to an EAW for his/her prosecution
is a Cypriot citizen, the Republic will not execute the request unless it is assured
that after being heard, the person will be transferred to the Republic to serve his/her
custodial sentence or execution order passed against him/her in the issuing Member
State. These two additional grounds for the mandatory non-execution of an EAW
appear to defeat the very purpose of the FD and of mutual recognition and sit rather
uneasily with the amended version of Art. 11(2)(f) of the Constitution.
Mention should also be made of the optional grounds for non-execution of an
EAWas set out inArt. 4 of the FrameworkDecision. The implementing law in Cyprus
does not reproduce Art. 4(1) of the FD, which provides for the possibility to lift the
requirement of double criminality for acts falling outside the list set in Art. 2(2)
and within the ambit of Art. 2(4) of the FD. All other optional grounds have been
implemented in the Cypriot law (Sect. 14). Given the human rights guarantees present
in the implementing law, the perhaps intentional omission of Art. 4(1) FDmay appear
128 See also Christou et al. 2009, p. 114.
129 Dr. Demetrios Hadjihambis, 9 January 2015.
130 Ibid.
131 Stefanou and Kapardis 2006, p. 264.
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regrettable in terms of substantive justice and mutual recognition. It actually appears
that even if an act falls within the ambit of Sect. 12(2) of the implementing law, for
which the requirement of double criminality is lifted, the execution of the EAW can
still fail on the basis of mandatory (or not) grounds for non-execution,132 which
provide speciﬁc procedural guarantees and/or, as a last resort, on the basis of the
general clause for the protection of fundamental human rights in Sect. 2(2) of the
implementing law.133 In this respect, it should also be noted that in 2014, Sect. 14 of
the implementing law was amended by Law 30(I)/2014 to the effect that
sub-sections 2, 3 and 4 were added, thereby reinforcing the discretion of the judicial
authorities to refuse the execution of an EAW in several additional instances
involving the protection of human rights embodied in procedural guarantees.134
2.3.3 Fair Trial and In Absentia Judgments
2.3.3.1 Article 30(1) of the Constitution provides that ‘[n]o person shall be denied
access to the court assigned to him by or under this Constitution’. The right of
access to the courts is however not an absolute right and is subject to reasonable
restrictions, such as time limitations.135 Article 30(2) then provides that ‘[i]n the
determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against
him, every person is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by
an independent, impartial and competent court established by law’. Again, this can
be subject to restrictions.136 Finally, Art. 30(3) combined with Art. 12(5) of the
Constitution set out the minimum rights of litigants, including in criminal pro-
ceedings and in line with Art. 6(3) ECHR. Thus, every person has the right to (i) be
informed of the reasons why he/she is required to appear before the court; (ii) to
present his/her case before the court and to have sufﬁcient time necessary for its
preparation; (iii) to adduce or cause to be adduced his/her evidence and to examine
witnesses according to law; (iv) to have a lawyer of his/her own choice and to have
free legal assistance where the interests of justice so require and as provided by law;
and (v) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he/she cannot understand or
132 Such grounds seem to be used within reason; see e.g. Civil Appeal, Panayiotis Philippou (no.
2) [2009] 1 CLR 693.
133 In Obolashvili, the District Judge, after refusing to execute an EAW on the grounds of the
principle of double jeopardy (Sect. 13(b) of the implementing law), also clearly stated that in any
case, a person would not be surrendered if his/her human rights were violated as protected under
Sect. 2(2) of the same law. In this case, the length of time since the alleged offence was found by
the District Judge to be unacceptable and sufﬁcient in itself to refuse the execution of the EAW.
See also Christou 2012, p. 68. Trial court decisions should however be contrasted with judgments
delivered by the Supreme Court in its appeal capacity (see Sect. 2.3.1 and n. 97 above).
134 For a pre-2014 review of procedural guarantees, see Christou 2012, pp. 71–77.
135 See Emilianides 2013, p. 171.
136 Ibid., p. 172.
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speak the language used in court. These minimum requirements are deemed to
constitute ‘fundamental elements of a fair trial’ and any deviation therefrom would
be in violation of the latter principle and invalidate the proceedings.137
Article 12(5)(c) of the Constitution provides in particular that every person
charged with an offence has the right to ‘to defend himself in person or through a
lawyer …’. If it is possible in civil proceedings to have a judgment in absentia
provided all minimum rights to a fair trial have been allegedly duly respected,138
this does not appear to be the case in criminal proceedings.139 For serious offences
in particular, the presence of the accused at the trial is required, given the nature of
the burden of proof in criminal proceedings and the right to self-representation and
participation in the proceedings guaranteed in the Constitution.140 As a matter of
public order, the presence of the lawyer of the person charged does not discharge
the authorities from their obligation to ensure that the accused is present at the trial,
at least at ﬁrst instance, unless that person has fled the country or has waived the
relevant rights.141
Despite the exceptional nature of judgments in absentia in the Cypriot legal
order, legislation was enacted in 2014 in Cyprus to implement the relevant provi-
sions of the EAW FD, as amended by the FD 2009/299/JHA of 26 February 2009,
reproducing verbatim the amendments, thereby enhancing the procedural rights of
137 Ibid., pp. 173–174.
138 See Apostolides v. Orams, Case No. 9968/04, 9 November 2004, where Mr. Apostolides
obtained a judgment by default of appearance in the Nicosia District Court against Mr. and Mrs.
Orams, British citizens who had purchased his property in the area not under the effective control
of the Republic of Cyprus. On 19 April 2005, a second judgment was delivered by the District
Court refusing to set aside the earlier judgment on the ground that there was no valid defence to the
claim (the court set aside appearance) – a judgment later upheld by the Supreme Court
(Apostolides v. Orams [2006] 1 CLR 1402). Those judgments were then registered in, and declared
enforceable by, the Queen’s Bench Division of the High Court of England pursuant to the Brussels
Regulation (Orders made by Master Eyre, 21 October 2005) and successfully challenged by the
Orams before the High Court Judge pursuant to Art. 43 of the Brussels Regulation (Orams v.
Apostolides (QB) [2007] 1 WLR 241). Mr. Apostolides appealed under Art. 44 of the Brussels
Regulation before the Court of Appeal of England and Wales, which decided to stay the pro-
ceedings and refer ﬁve questions pertaining also to the right of the defence, service of documents
and public order as grounds for refusal of enforcement of judgments to the ECJ (Case C-420/07
Apostolides [2009] ECR I-03571). For a detailed analysis of the judgment of the ECJ in this case,
see S. Laulhé Shaelou 2011, pp. 342–356.
139 See Report by the European Committee on Crime Problems (CDPC), Council of Europe,
writing about judgments in absentia in Cyprus that ‘it is not possible except in the case of speciﬁed
very minor offences for which the accused requests to be permitted to be represented only by his
counsel (section 45 of the Criminal Procedure Code) or if summons is proved to have been served
on him and he fails to appear in which case the Court may hear the case in his absence (section 89
of the Criminal Procedure Code)’, available at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/pc-oc/
PCOC_documents/Documents%202013/PC-OC%20(2013)%201%20Summary%20and%20Com
pilation%20of%20Replies%20Quest%20judgements%20in%20absentia%20and%20the%20poss
ibility%20of%20retrial.pdf.
140 See also Sect. 63 of the Criminal Procedure Code, Chapter 155 of the laws of Cyprus.
141 Paraskeva 2015, p. 212.
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persons and fostering the application of the principle of mutual recognition to
decisions rendered in the absence of the person concerned at the trial. The courts are
now under an obligation (as opposed to this being within their discretion before) to
ﬁll in Annex A reproduced from the amending FD. The new legal framework has
been perceived positively by the Cypriot courts as giving them additional discre-
tionary grounds to refuse the execution of an EAW (even if no judgments seem to
have been issued in absentia so far).142
2.3.4 The Right to a Fair Trial – Practical Challenges Regarding
a Trial Abroad
2.3.4.1–2.3.4.2 As previously noted, judges in Cyprus try to ensure that EAWs are
executed.143 Beyond the legal framework as developed above, no further infor-
mation is available on the assistance which Cyprus extends to its own nationals in
extradition procedures. Generally and in terms of issuing EAWs, there have been
cases where persons requested under an EAW issued by the Cypriot authorities and
executed in another Member State have been subsequently cleared of charges by the
courts in Cyprus.144 There have also been cases where EU nationals extradited to
Cyprus under an EAW have been found guilty by the Cypriot courts and transferred
back to their country to serve their sentence.145 Cyprus, however, remains a place
for fugitives to hide in the areas not under the effective control of its government,
where the application of EU law is suspended, thereby avoiding EAWs issued by
Cypriot or other Member States’ authorities.146 There are, however, some (rare)
examples of surrender of a requested persons under an EAW in connection with the
illegal purchase of property in the occupied areas of the Republic of Cyprus, which
falls under the category of ‘fraud’,147 forming part of the 32 offences for which the
requirement of double criminality has been lifted. On this basis, the UK surrendered
a requested person under an EAW to the Cypriot authorities in accordance with the
principle of mutual recognition and despite not having an equivalent offence under
UK law.148
142 See e.g. John Constandinides v. Attorney General, Civil Appeal No. 347/2014, 5 March 2015
(in Greek).
143 See Christou et al. 2009, p. 113.
144 See also http://gmadvocates.com/cases/cypriot-businessman-brought-cyprus-under-european-
arrest-warrant-found-be-innocent-charges.
145 http://www.fairtrials.org/cases/michael-binnington-and-luke-atkinson/.
146 http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-19485421. For a detailed legal analysis of the application of EU
law in Cyprus, including in relation to the areas not under the effective control of the government,
see Laulhé Shaelou 2010a.
147 See http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/embassies/embassy_stockholm.nsf/ecsw19_en/ecsw19_en?
OpenDocument.
148 See http://www.chroniclelive.co.uk/news/local-news/former-north-east-nightclub-owner-136
3996; see also Christou 2012, pp. 61–62.
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2.3.5 The Right to Effective Judicial Protection
2.3.5.1–2.3.5.4 There are mechanisms available in the Cypriot legal order that
guarantee access to justice for individuals, such as the principle that time does not
start running until full knowledge of the facts has been obtained. In administrative
cases, if the Supreme Court has to decide on a matter of facts, it hears evidence ﬁrst,
including from other jurisdictions if necessary. The principle of mutual recognition
is based on the mutual recognition of foreign law/judgments; this principle existed
in Cyprus before it was applied in an EU context to civil and criminal matters, as
Cyprus is a mixed legal system.149 As such, the conception of the role of the courts
in Cyprus has not really changed and remains, in the context of mutual recognition,
mainly concerned with a review of coercive actions by the executive and the
justiﬁcation by the state for its actions.150 In a wider framework, the courts in
Cyprus may be criticised for privileging formalities over substance. The
Apostolides v. Orams case is probably an example of extreme formalism through a
literal interpretation of the meaning of losing a case ‘by default’ (lack of appear-
ance) rather than on the merits, thereby taking the right to appear to the extreme.151
2.4 The EU Data Retention Directive
2.4.1 The implementation of the Data Retention Directive raised serious constitu-
tional problems in Cyprus and resulted in the Sixth Constitutional Amendment
(Law 51 (I)/2010 of 4 June 2010) after a decision of the Supreme Court in
Alexandrou (see below). The effect was the amendment of Art. 17(2) of the
Constitution that provided for the limitations available for Art. 17(1). Article 17(1)
states that ‘[e]very person has the right to respect for, and to the secrecy of, his
correspondence and other communication if such other communication is made
through means not prohibited by law’. The new provision of Art. 17(2) allows
interference with the aforementioned right through data retention on the basis of a
judicial order that relates to the investigation of serious crimes carrying a prison
sentence of ﬁve years or more. That amendment remains in full force today despite
the decision of the CJEU in Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger and Others.152
Originally, the Republic implemented the Directive with the Law 183(I)/2007
(as amended) that introduced a system for data retention along the lines the
Directive requires. However, in terms of scope, the Law applied for any crime that
is deﬁned in Sect. 2(1) as ‘a felony’ either by the Criminal Code or any other
149 See Hatzimihail 2013.
150 Interview with Dr. Demetrios Hadjihambis, 9 January 2015.
151 Ibid.
152 Joined cases C-293/12 and 594/12 Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger and Others [2014]
ECLI:EU:C:2014:238.
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legislation and/or which carries a maximum prison sentence of ﬁve years.
Therefore, the Cypriot approach opted for the widest possible deﬁnition of serious
crime, in order to resolve long-lasting problems relating to the law of evidence and
to the empowerment of the police to effectively combat crime in general.
The constitutionality of Law 183(I)/2007 was examined by the Supreme Court in
the case of Alexandrou153 that concerned the criminal investigation and prosecution
of an individual. The Supreme Court assessed whether to grant leave for certiorari
in relation to an ex parte order of a ﬁrst instance court that permitted the use of the
data retention system. The reasoning of the Supreme Court needs to be examined
carefully because the decision in Alexandrou is often wrongly cited as an example
of national reaction to the Directive’s approach.
In reality, the Court disassociated the implementation of the Directive from Law
183(I)/2007 despite the fact that the preamble of the legislation expressly stated
implementation of the Directive as its intention. The consequence of that disasso-
ciation was that the relevant Law was a national measure that had no connection
with EU law, and thus could not beneﬁt from the protective scope of Art. 1A of the
Constitution. This reasoning of the Supreme Court was formed by relying on the
ECJ ruling in Ireland v. Parliament and Council,154 from which it deduced that
since the Directive was adopted on the correct legal basis (Art. 95 EC that provides
for harmonising measures for the common market), then as a corollary the Directive
has as its only purpose exactly that. Therefore, the Supreme Court construed the
ECJ ruling as limiting the scope of application of the Directive only to matters
relating to the legal basis upon which the adoption of the Directive was based.
Criminal law and the effective combating of crime were outside the scope of the
Directive and therefore the relevant national legislation was disconnected from the
Directive. Moreover, it must be noted that the Supreme Court did not examine the
provisions of the Directive per se, as that was held to be unnecessary since the ECJ
had already examined the purpose of the Directive. In addition, the Supreme Court
did not consider whether it was necessary to submit a preliminary reference. The
outcome of the preceding reasoning was to approach the relevant law as purely
domestic in content and, as such, as unconstitutional and in conflict with Art. 17 (1)
of the Constitution.
The judgment paved the way for the Sixth Constitutional Amendment. It must be
noted that the constitutional amendment cannot on its own regulate the area in full
and hence a legislative act was required in order to specify the scope and manner of
application of what the amendment permitted. The only legislation in force that
practically enables access to electronic data remains Law 183(I)/2007 that has as its
stated aim the implementation of the Directive. Therefore, the retention of data
became a domestic issue and policy engraved in the Constitution, but its application
is governed by legislation intended to implement the Directive. Moreover, that
legislation was held by the Supreme Court to be going beyond the proper scope of
153 Alexandrou [2010] 1 CLR 17.
154 Case C-301/06 Ireland v. Parliament and Council [2009] ECR I-00593.
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the Directive that was identiﬁed as relating only to market harmonisation. This
creates a constitutional paradox since the matter of data retention in its criminal law
context seems to have been regulated in Cyprus as a matter of national law and not
EU law. This poses the question whether in the absence of the Directive such a
course of action would have been followed, and the answer can only be negative.
Before the entry into force of the Constitutional Amendment, a case came before
the Supreme Court that touched upon similar matters. In Demetris Siamishis,155 the
Supreme Court had to examine the constitutionality of the execution of a data
retention order that chronologically took place prior the introduction of the Sixth
Amendment. The case concerned an appeal from a criminal conviction, and since
the appeal could only take into account the law as it stood at the time of the
conviction, that conviction was held by the Supreme Court to be unstable as it had
taken into account evidence obtained via infringement of the right to privacy. The
Court emphasised the connection between the Directive and Law 183(I)/2007,
which was considered to be an act implementing the Directive and as such enjoyed
the protective status under Art. 1A of the Constitution. It therefore becomes puz-
zling to compare the preceding statement with the rationale of the decision in
Alexandrou, and there is clearly inconsistency as to whether Art. 1A could apply to
Law 183(I)/2007. If Demetris Siamishis is good law, then there was no need for
amending the Constitution. If Alexandrou is good law, then there should not be any
substantially different approach in Demetris Siamishis.
The next important decision that followed the Constitutional Amendment was
that in Christos Matsia.156 The details of the case are crucial since the case was
decided after the aforementioned amendment, but the relevant orders instructing the
telecommunications company to make the data retained available to the police were
issued prior to the amendment. The Supreme Court in a much lengthier judgment
approached the issue of the relation of Law 183(I)/2007 and the proper imple-
mentation of the Directive, and reached the same conclusion as in Alexandrou. It
was held that the Law exceeded what was required for the implementation of the
Directive and was therefore beyond the scope of Art. 1A of the Constitution and, by
implication, beyond the relevant supremacy clause that would have shielded Law
183(I)/2007 from a ﬁnding of unconstitutionality. The new element in the reasoning
of the Supreme Court was that the Court expressly stated that ‘[t]he Law in question
exceeds the necessary and proportionate of what the obligations of the Republic
entail under EU law’.157 That conclusion was solely justiﬁed by full citation of
paras. 80–85 of the CJEU’s decision in Ireland v. Parliament and Council.
The new element in Christos Matsia was the analysis of the importance of the
right to privacy and the detailed citation of its development through the case law,
with speciﬁc reference to the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. However, at no point was
there a comparison of the standards applied under pre-existing national
155 [2011] 2 CLR 308.
156 [2011] 1 CLR 152.
157 Paragraph 170 of the Judgment (translation by the author).
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jurisprudence and under the ECHR with the EU standard, hence no criticism of the
Directive was in any way attempted. The key point is that the right to privacy
provided the benchmark, and that right did not form part of the argumentation that
the ECJ had adopted in Ireland v. Parliament and Council. This was a clear
example of a situation in which a preliminary reference should have been submitted
to the CJEU with the same content as the subsequent references in Digital Rights
Ireland and Seitlinger and Others.
After the entry into force of the Sixth Constitutional Amendment, the Supreme
Court consistently held that the data retention system was constitutionally per-
missible as a matter of national law. From that case law, reference can be made to
two judgments that were chronologically subsequent to the ECJ judgment in Digital
Rights Ireland and Seitlinger and Others. In the case of Attorney General v.
Isaia158 and in the case of Sikifantou,159 the important issue was the impact of the
ECJ decision in Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger and Others on the system of
data retention that Law 183(I)/2007 introduced. Surprisingly, the Supreme Court in
both cases stated that ‘the impact of the CJEU’s ruling is apparent’ since ‘Law 183
(I)/2007, according to its preamble, was adopted for the purpose of implementing
the Directive on Data Retention’. Nonetheless, the ‘apparent’ is problematic given
the earlier ﬁnding in Alexandrou; however, in the case of Attorney General v. Isaia,
the Court, by a majority, relied on exactly that statement.
In that case the majority of the Supreme Court held that the annulment of the
Directive does not impact on the case before it because Law 183(I)/2007 remains in
force as a national measure. The majority decision was extremely brief on the
matter and made no mention of the Directive or the ECJ judgment that annulled it.
The Court insisted on the existence of a clear distinction between the Directive and
Law 183(I)/2007, thus following the rationale and approach of the earlier case law
on the matter. It is submitted that such a distinction is formalistic and distorts the
legislative intent that was clearly stated in the preamble of Law 183(I)/2007.
The minority judgment (Nathanael and Nicolatos JJ) adopted a rather different
approach on the matter. The emphasis was placed on the ECJ decision in Digital
Rights Ireland and Seitlinger and Others and on the argumentation that the ECJ
applied especially in relation to the principle of proportionality. The conclusion
reached stated that Law 183(I)/2007 was founded on the Directive, and that
becomes evident from the preamble of the Law. As a result of the annulment of the
Directive, the ‘legitimising foundation’ of the Law disappears and takes with it the
totality of the system that enables the police to have access to the retained data.
Therefore, the issue arises whether the minority considers Law 183(I)/2007 as being
invalid and, if yes, on what basis, given the existence of the Sixth Constitutional
Amendment.
To summarise, the approach of the Supreme Court in the area of data retention,
either as a matter of EU law or as a matter of national constitutional law, is
158 Case 402/2012, 07 July 2014.
159 Case 213/2014, 18 December 2014.
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inconsistent and inherently problematic. The Supreme Court has in effect neces-
sitated a Constitutional Amendment that altered the balance of the content of the
right to privacy. The consequence is that the implementation of the Directive has
become a matter of national law, irrespective of the stated intention in the preamble
of the relevant Law. Therefore, the subsequent annulment of the Directive by the
CJEU becomes irrelevant, whereas the whole issue arose out of the need to
implement the Directive. This is clearly conceptually cyclical, structurally unsound
and constitutionally heretical.
2.5 Unpublished or Secret Legislation
2.5.1 Articles 3 and 104 of the Constitution require the publication of all laws as an
essential requirement for their validity. There is no case law nor academic comment
on this point. The principle of due publication is implicitly also embodied in the
principle of good administration.
2.6 Rights and General Principles of Law in the Context
of Market Regulation: Property Rights, Legal Certainty,
Non-retroactivity and Proportionality
2.6.1 As a background to this important part of the Report for Cyprus, the reader
should be reminded of the fact that Art. 41 of the 2003 Act of Accession provided
that the European Commission had the power to ‘adopt measures to facilitate the
transition’ of the new Member States to the regime of the Common Agricultural
Policy.160 The European Commission therefore adopted Regulation (EC) No 1972/
2003161 (for agricultural products) and Regulation (EC) 60/2004162 (for the sugar
market) on this basis, mainly in order to avoid the risk of speculation. Both
Regulations required the new Member States to levy charges on holders of surplus
stocks on 1 May 2004 for products in free circulation. With respect to the sugar
market more speciﬁcally,163 Art. 6(1) of Regulation No 60/2004 required the
European Commission to determine by 31 October 2004 at the latest, for each
160 See Laulhé Shaelou 2010b, pp. 496–497.
161 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1972/2003 of 10 November 2003 on transitional measures to
be adopted in respect of trade in agricultural products on account of the accession of the Czech
Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia,
[2004] OJ 2003 L 293/3.
162 Commission Regulation (EC) No 60/2004 of 14 January 2004 laying down transitional
measures in the sugar sector by reason of the accession of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus,
Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia, [2004] OJ L 9/8.
163 For litigation regarding other agricultural products, see Laulhé Shaelou 2010b pp. 498–500.
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Member State, the quantity of sugar as such or in processed products exceeding ‘the
quantity considered as being normal carry-over stock at 1 May 2004’, which needed
to be eliminated from the market ‘at the expense of the new Member States’. Article
6(2) also provided that Member States had to eliminate such quantities in excess by
30 April 2005, as determined by the Commission. For this purpose, Art. 6(3) of the
Regulation required the new Member States to dispose on 1 May 2004 of a system
for the identiﬁcation of traded or produced surplus quantities and to use the system
to compel the operators concerned to eliminate quantities at their own expense. The
burden of proof was on the operators and, if not satisﬁed by 30 April 2005, the new
Member States were entitled to charge an amount to the operators concerned. With
Commission Regulation (EC) No 832/2005,164 the European Commission ﬁxed the
surplus quantities to be eliminated for each new Member State, taking into con-
sideration activities in the sugar sector of each new Member State before accession
(period 1 May 2003–30 April 2004 compared to the average of quantities in the
same period for the three previous years). The ﬁgure for Cyprus was 40,213 tonnes.
The Commission subsequently extended the deadlines with Commission
Regulation (EC) No 651/2005.165
At the national level, Law 40(1)/2005 was passed to implement the Commission
Regulations on the transitional measures in the sector of agricultural goods. The
Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism, appointed as the competent authority,
had informed the operators of Regulation 60/2004 prior to accession and, upon
accession, had requested the relevant information from the operators. In 2005, it set
out the surplus quantity for each operator and, in 2006, it proceeded with issuing
penalties against the operators concerned on the basis of Art. 5(1) of Law 40(1)/
2005.166 Two administrative actions were therefore taken by the Ministry of
Commerce on the basis of Law 40(1)/2005: (i) a decision dated 2 August 2005,
requesting the addressees to eliminate the surplus quantities allocated to them by 30
November 2005; and (ii) a decision dated 21 August 2006, imposing a penalty on the
operators who did not comply (or only partly complied) with the ﬁrst decision. As a
result, 33 recourses were introduced before the Supreme Court of Cyprus against the
2005 decision, as well as 18 recourses against the 2006 decision, totalling 51 actions
which were joined and brought before the Full Chamber of the Supreme Court. In
fact, there were actually 52 actions in total, but one of them was judged on the merits
on 16 July 2007 by a single judge chamber.167 Judge Hadjihambis ruled in this case
164 Commission Regulation (EC) No 832/2005 of 31 May 2005 on the determination of surplus
quantities of sugar, isoglucose and fructose for the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia,
Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia, [2005] OJ L 138/3.
165 Commission Regulation (EC) No 651/2005 of 28 April 2005 amending Regulation (EC) No
60/2004 laying down transitional measures in the sugar sector by reason of the accession of the
Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and
Slovakia, [2005] OJ L 108/3.
166 Laulhé Shaelou 2010b, pp. 496–497.
167 Morphis Morphy & Associates Ltd v. RoC through Ministry of Commerce, Case No. 121/2007,
16 July 2007.
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that the system put in place for calculating the surplus quantities fell within the scope
of Commission Regulation No 60/2004, due to the margin of discretion left to the
new Member States to determine the method for such calculation.168 The case was
appealed169 but the Supreme Court decided that this appeal would not be heard until
a decision had been issued in the 51 other actions.
During the process of judicial review of administrative actions under Art.146 of
the Constitution, an act must be deemed both administrative and executory in order
to be reviewed. An act is deemed executory if it is ‘determinative in itself of the
rights and obligations of a person under the authority of the administration’, and the
Supreme Court examines whether an act is executory ex proprio motu.170 On 13
July 2011, the Supreme Court (Full Chamber) considered the 33 joined actions
challenging the 2005 decision171 and ruled that the 2005 decision was not execu-
tory in view of the 2006 decision which imposed the penalties. It therefore rejected
the 33 actions based on preliminary objections. On 21 March 2013, the Supreme
Court (Full Chamber) reconvened to consider the 18 recourses for judicial review of
the 2006 decision. The Court found (preliminary objections) that the 2005 and 2006
decisions constituted a series of two administrative actions and could be reviewed
by the Court in accordance with the Chrikar jurisprudence. It then considered the
following grounds for review: (i) retroactivity of taxation prohibited by Art. 24 of
the Constitution; (ii) lack of reasonable and due inquiry; (iii) lack of due reasoning;
and (iv) lack of competence. The Court ruled that the consideration of the
retroactivity of the charge, at the constitutional level, was not ‘necessary’ in order to
establish the ratio of the case and gave no further explanation as to why this was so.
The Court then found several reasons why there was a lack of due inquiry on the
part of the Republic of Cyprus. For instance, it noted that there was no system
speciﬁed by law as of 1 May 2004, but on 15 April 2005 (Art. 6 Law 40(I)/105
provided for the retroactive ratiﬁcation of acts taken during this period). It noted the
absence of a legal system duly notifying natural and legal persons of their rights and
obligations. Since the surplus quantities had not been established with certainty, the
Court found that there was no need to refer to the ECJ and distinguished the facts of
the present case from the ones arising in the Balbiino case referred to the ECJ by the
Tallinn Administrative Court (Estonia) in the ‘sugar saga’.172 The Court further
ruled that there was a lack of justiﬁcation in the methods of assessment and
identiﬁcation of surpluses and, ﬁnally, that there was lack of competence, since the
Minister himself had not authorised the actions.
168 Laulhé Shaelou 2010b, p. 499.
169 The Appeal, scheduled for 12 September 2014 for procedural considerations, was withdrawn.
The action was initially based on its compatibility with EU law, the violation of constitutional
rights – no retroactivity of taxation, right to trade and non-discrimination, and ﬁnally on a review
of administrative actions.
170 Emilianides 2013, p. 197.
171 Chrikar Trading and others [2011] 3 CLR 541.
172 Case C-560/07 Balbiino [2009] ECR I-04447. For a review of the relevant litigation in the new
Member States, see Albi 2009 and Lazowski 2010.
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The Court’s decision in the above case was based on the principles of sound
administration as established in Law 158(I)/1999 on the General Principles of
Administrative Law. As seen in Sect. 2.1, this law is a source of constitutional law
as it refers to matters of public law. Some principles like retroactivity and
non-discrimination are protected both under the Constitution and this law. But since
an Art. 146 recourse is limited by nature to considerations of administrative law and
does not extend to a review of constitutionality, it would appear that only the
constitutional principles expressly mentioned among the general principles of
administrative law are implicit in a review of administrative actions under Art.
146 (namely the protection of legitimate expectations and the principle of pro-
portionality). Even so, it would appear that they will only be considered by the
Court when necessary for the establishment of the ratio of the case. This is also true
of rights protected expressly under the Constitution, but the Court will not raise
constitutional issues out of its own motion.173
Thus, contrary to constitutional courts in other new Member States such as
Hungary, Estonia and the Czech Republic,174 the Supreme Court in Cyprus did not
consider any constitutional issues raised in the sugar cases. It restrained itself to a
mere control of administrative actions. There is no reference to the EU legal
framework either, even if the supremacy of EU law appears to be implicit. To the
extent that this decision of the Supreme Court relieves operators from penalties, it
could be said to participate in the protection of individual (economic) rights. It is
also a clear signal to the public administration in Cyprus that despite EU accession,
legal certainty in administrative procedures must prevail and no lowering of
national standards is permitted by the Court.175 It is argued that this ﬁnding could
be of utmost signiﬁcance, especially in the context of the ﬁnancial crisis (on con-
cerns about the protection of property rights in a dissenting opinion in the ‘bail-in’
case, see Sect. 2.7.3).
In the meantime, Cyprus requested the annulment of Regulation 651/2005
before the General Court of the EU because it argued that it changed its legal
situation under Regulation 60/2004.176 The General Court found on the contrary
that the amendments with respect to Cyprus were purely procedural and that the act
(as amended) had become ﬁnal vis-à-vis Cyprus since it had not been challenged
within the deadline.177 The action was therefore found inadmissible. However, this
was based on the ﬁndings of the General Court that there was no need to be a
Member State to challenge generally applicable acts under (then) Art. 230 EC, and
that it was sufﬁcient to be a legal person.178 The General Court had concluded that
there was no violation of the principle of effective judicial protection towards
173 Interview with Dr. Demetrios Hadjihambis, 20 August 2014.
174 See Albi 2009, Lazowski 2010 and Laulhé Shaelou 2010b.
175 Interview with Dr. Demetrios Hadjihambis, 20 August 2014.
176 Joined Cases T-300/05 and T-316/05 Republic of Cyprus v. Commission [2009] ECR II-00192.
177 Ibid., paras. 258–260.
178 Ibid., paras. 241, 245.
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Cyprus in this case.179 The ECJ however overruled the speciﬁc ﬁnding of the
General Court on the locus standi of new Member States in the Polish case seeking
the annulment of Regulation 1972/2003, ﬁnding that the General Court had erred in
law.180 Cyprus did not appeal the decision of the General Court although its
arguments with respect to Regulation 651/2005 had not been heard, contrary to
Poland for whom Regulation 735/2004 was found to make substantial changes to
Regulation 1972/2003 and whose action was deemed admissible, thereby raising
the question of effective judicial protection vis-à-vis Cyprus.
2.7 The ESM Treaty, Austerity Programmes
and the Democratic, Rule-of-Law-Based State
2.7.1–2.7.2 The constitutionality of the Treaty Establishing the European Stability
Mechanism (ESM Treaty) has not been directly raised in Cyprus despite the fact
that the Supreme Court had to examine the legality of the ‘bail-in’ that was imposed
on Cyprus. Speciﬁcally, issues relating to the structure of the ﬁnancial stability
mechanism and its actual funding were not discussed in connection with budget
autonomy and responsibility. Moreover, no constitutional amendment was intro-
duced in relation to those matters or Eurobonds and the Banking Union.
2.7.3 Some of the case law regarding the impact of austerity measures on consti-
tutional rights was provided in Sect. 2.2.
A further central case regarding the judicial protection of property rights and
judicial review concerned the ‘bail-in’ measures in 2013. As is explained in
Sect. 3.5, the bail-in decision resulted from a political agreement at the Eurogroup
level and had the effect of imposing a levy amounting to partial conﬁscation of all
unsecured deposits, that is below 100,000 EUR, in the two systemic Cypriot banks.
The legality of the measures adopted to impose the ‘bail-in’ were contested in
Myrto Christodoulou,181 or what is referred to in the rest of the Report as the ‘bail
in’ case. The majority decision, taking an unsatisfactory position, classiﬁed the
matter as one belonging to the sphere of private law, and therefore the proper course
of action was to initiate actions for damage for breach of contract and tort law.
Therefore, the issue was not one of administrative law, as it concerned the rela-
tionship between depositors and the banks, and the recourse ﬁled under Art. 146 of
the Constitution was dismissed. In terms of the civil actions, the criterion to be
applied was whether the loss suffered would have been greater if the ‘bail-in’ had
not taken place. This criterion was mentioned eight times in the judgment of the
majority. The majority judgment did not examine the EU aspect of the matter nor
consider the possibility of sending a preliminary reference.
179 Ibid., paras. 242–247.
180 Case C–335/09 P Poland v. Commission [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:385.
181 Myrto Christodoulou [2013] 3 CLR 427.
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In contrast to that formalistic approach, the dissenting judgment by Judge
Erotokritou takes a different and much more preferable approach that is perhaps the
most complete attempt in Cyprus to discuss the nature of the principle of primacy of
EU law and its relationship with national constitutional law. Judge Erotokritou
stated that the matter is one that relates to human rights, as it affects the right to
property as protected under Art. 17 of the EU Charter and under Protocol 1 ECHR,
as well as under Art. 23 of the Constitution. The adopted approach is so important
that it necessitates fuller citations:
Recent events in Europe due to the ﬁnancial crisis and the measures taken, give the
impression that not only international law, but also the European and national law seems to
be rewritten. It is therefore imperative in order to safeguard the rights of the parties arising
from the TEU, to give the chance to national administrative courts to control not only the
legality of the contested acts, but also the compatibility of the various national laws which
led to the contested measures with EU law.
In this part, the dissenting judgment raises the point that the situation that is
emerging is one that deviates from pre-existing EU law and creates a new set of
factors that are different from those upon which the relationship between national
law and EU law has been based so far. Therefore, the ‘bail-in issue’ is rightly
approached as an issue exceeding the consensus that pre-existed, thus necessitating
the scrutiny of the compatibility of the new EU/international law measures with the
rights arising from EU law. Judge Erotokritou continued:
Where conflict is found and there is no ambiguity, Union law is to be applied, as it takes
precedence and is directly applicable. Where conflict is found, but the requisite clarity as to
the content and validity of the provisions of Union law is not present, then the national
court has the power under Art. 267 TFEU to apply with a preliminary question to the CJEU
calling either for the interpretation of certain provisions of EU law, e.g. free movement of
capital (Art. 63 TEU), or for a ruling on the validity of speciﬁc legal instruments of the EU
institutions. With this assistance, the national court may now proceed to examine the
compatibility of national law with EU law.
In this part of the approach, Judge Erotokritou focused on the use of the pre-
liminary reference procedure as a useful tool for exercising the national judicial
power of scrutiny. In addition, Judge Erotokritou stated:
National sovereignty undoubtedly gives way to the supremacy of European law and rightly
so I would say. But it seems that the further erosion of that national sovereignty and the
parallel erosion of fundamental rights, often through informal procedures should at some
stage be scrutinised by the CJEU, albeit indirectly through Article 267, as to whether it is
compatible with the primary law of the European Union.
This is perhaps the centre of gravity of the approach of Judge Erotokritou. The
judge adopts a pragmatic approach that accepts the limitation of national sover-
eignty as a logical consequence of the need to apply the principle of primacy of EU
law. This indirectly refers to the nature of the EU system as being founded on the
principle of conferred powers that the Member States have voluntarily transferred to
the Union. It is respectfully submitted that if this point would have been speciﬁcally
included in the dissenting opinion, then it would have acquired a more holistic
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theoretical and substantial character in relation to the way that the national con-
stitutional system sees the Union. This would therefore have formed an opportunity
for starting to express the inherent reservations as regards the principle of primacy
of EU law and for starting to set the limits to the acceptance of the principle.
The next argument is also very interesting, as it identiﬁes the problem that is
created by any further unilateral alteration of the equilibrium that relates to the
transfer of sovereignty to the EU and to the corresponding application of the
principle of primacy of EU law. This becomes especially relevant if the impact of
the alteration is directed towards the protection of fundamental rights and has as a
result a unilateral and substantial shift in competences. However, this point could
have been further explained as having the meaning that any expansion of EU
competences at the expense of national sovereignty in a way that structurally affects
the constitutional identity cannot be accepted by the national legal order and even
by the ECJ.
One cannot avoid making the comparison of the dissenting decision with the
decision and the reasoning of the Bundesverfassungsgericht in the Honeywell
case.182 There it was held that the ultra vires review by the Federal Constitutional
Court, namely the striking down of an EU act, can only be considered by the
national court if a breach of competences on the part of the European bodies is
manifestly in breach of competences and the impugned act led to a structurally
signiﬁcant shift in the structure of competences that is to the detriment of the
Member States. A reference to this judgment would have given an essential element
of justiﬁcation to the argument that Judge Erotokritou was making. This would
have been useful also because the Judge impliedly followed the reasoning of the
German Court by requiring the CJEU to scrutinise the potential erosion of com-
petences, thus placing the responsibility on the CJEU and not solely on the national
court. This reflects exactly the inherent idea that the relationship between national
constitutional law and EU law is one that both parties have an obligation to safe-
guard in order for the relationship to remain one of partnership. Judge Erotokritou
continued to reinforce exactly the preceding point by stating that:
In the EU legal system, the supremacy of the rule of law and of legal protection, which form
a fundamental principle of the European Union and which are inextricably intertwined with
the Republic, can not be eliminated through the creation of exemptions from judicial
administrative control, each time for various reasons national governments are in trouble
and take decisions which violate basic human rights that are derived from the legal order of
the European Union and generally from the European acquis communautaire. The legal
restrictions imposed by the Constitution on the exercise of state power must be maintained
even in critical and difﬁcult conditions such as those that exist today, in order to ensure the
supremacy of the rule of law and of the principle of legality.
To summarise, the approach is the best and only example of real discussion
about the nature of the relationship between national constitutional law and the
principle of primacy of EU law in Cyprus. The approach by Judge Erotokritou
182 BVerfG, Order of 06 July 2010 - 2 BvR 2661/06 - Rn. (1-116).
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contains many important structural and substantive points that reflect the theoretical
perspective about the principle of primacy of EU law and which has two dimen-
sions: that of the CJEU and that of the national Constitution. Moreover, Judge
Erotokritou places both parties under an obligation to safeguard the delicate equi-
librium in order to prevent any unilateral alterations that could create a clash. In
doing so, Judge Erotokritou removes the possibility of tensions arising by requiring
the national court to ﬁrst submit a preliminary reference. This is the same approach
inherent in Honeywell. The identiﬁcation of the delicate issue of fundamental rights
and the indirect reference to competences through the connection with the erosion
of national sovereignty is also in line with the rich jurisprudence of other national
constitutional courts.
Nonetheless, the approach of Judge Erotokritou also does not go far enough and
does not fully elaborate on all the crucial points that it raised. The lack of any
reference to the jurisprudence of other national constitutional courts, including
Honeywell, is one such step short of full elaboration.
The last point to be made is that the dissenting opinion was unfortunately not
endorsed by the majority. Nonetheless, it is submitted that the fact that views expressed
were not endorsed by the majority does not pre-empt the subsequent adoption of the
reasoning of Judge Erotokritou as the formula that the Supreme Court can apply to the
primacy of EU law. The dissenting judgment exists and can always be used to sup-
plement the already incomplete approach of the SupremeCourt on this issue, regardless
of the different views of the majority on one speciﬁc matter, i.e. bail-in.
2.8 Judicial Review of EU Measures: Access to Justice
and the Standard of Review
2.8.1–2.8.6 The characteristics of judicial review in the Cypriot legal order have
already been addressed elsewhere in this Report.183 Overall, standing requirements
have been said to be construed broadly by the Supreme Court, thereby ‘guaran-
teeing the procedural access to effective judicial protection’.184 As a manifestation
of the doctrine of separation of powers, the Supreme Court in Cyprus seems to be
responsible for keeping the balance between access to judicial review and the good
administration of justice.185 This duty appears to extend also to indirect judicial
review in the context of preliminary references to the CJEU.
183 See e.g. Sects. 2.1.3, 2.2 and 2.6 above. No statistical data regarding annulment and relevant
grounds is available.
184 Kombos 2010b, pp. 329 and 350.
185 Ibid., p. 338.
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It should be noted in this respect that the Courts Law of 1960, as amended,186
used to provide for a right of appeal against decisions of lower courts to refer or not
to refer a matter to the CJEU, limited initially (in 2007) to instances where the court
ruled on the basis of an application made by one of the parties to the case, and
subsequently extended (in 2008) to cases where the courts would decide to refer on
their own motion. The authors of the present Report respectively provided at the
time an extensive critical analysis of the right to refer or not to refer a matter to the
CJEU.187 Sufﬁce to note here that following the Cartesio case,188 the Law since
2009 provides that no such appeal is possible.
Following the removal of the right to appeal decisions of lower courts to refer or
not to refer to the CJEU, it can be said that lower courts are quite free to use the
preliminary reference mechanism, including in matters of interpretation and validity
of EU legal acts. However, the ﬁrst preliminary reference to the CJEU from a court
other than the Supreme Court only came in 2013 and did not concern matters of
validity of EU legal acts.189 In the meantime, the lower courts have gradually
developed their legal reasoning in terms of dealing with requests from applicants to
refer questions of interpretation of EU law to the CJEU, but still too often reject
such requests with little justiﬁcation, resulting in a very low number of preliminary
references to the CJEU from such courts (three in total).190 As far as the Supreme
Court is concerned, only four preliminary references have been made to date.191
These four references appear to indicate a steady trend towards the progressive
awareness and ‘mastering’ of the preliminary reference mechanism by the Court.192
Sufﬁce to note here that none of these references appears to raise issues of validity
of EU legal acts.
Regarding concerns about a gap in judicial review, in the context of the ﬁnancial
crisis measures, it might be worth briefly recalling the concern in the dissenting
opinion of Judge Erotokritou (Sect. 2.7.3) that in the intertwined EU legal order ‘the
rule of law and legal protection can not be eliminated through the creation of
exemptions from judicial administrative control, each time for various reasons
national governments are in trouble and take decisions which violate basic human
rights’.
186 Law 14 of 1960, Sect. 25, new sub-sect. 2A, as amended in 2007, 2008 and 2009.
187 Laulhé Shaelou 2010b; Kombos 2010b. For a comprehensive, unpublished study see
Lycourgos 2014.
188 Case C-210/06 Cartesio [2008] ECR I-09641.
189 Sotiris (Akis) Papasavvas v. O Philelftheros Dimosia Eteria ltd and others, Nicosia District
Court, Case No. 9493/10, 27 March 2013 (in Greek).
190 Court of Justice of the European Union, Annual report 2013, Luxembourg 2014, pp. 118.
191 Ibid.
192 Especially Cypra Ltd v. the Republic, Administrative Appeal 78/2009, 5 June 2013 and Alpha
Bank Cyprus Ltd v. Si Senh Dau and others, Joined Civil Appeals E23/2013-E29/2013, 13
September 2013 (in Greek). See Laulhé Shaelou 2010b.
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2.9 Other Constitutional Rights and Principles
2.9.1 There have been no further notable developments in Cyprus.
2.10 Common Constitutional Traditions
2.10.1–2.10.2 The influence and impact of the common constitutional traditions on
the deﬁnition and interpretation of concepts of EU law has been minimal. From the
Cypriot perspective, the matter has not been examined by the Supreme Court, but it
can be argued that the opportunity to do so was missed in the ‘bail-in’ case and in
relation to social rights that form a distinct and important part of the national
Constitution. Reference can be made to the rather unique passage in Art. 9 of the
Constitution that states ‘[e]very person has the right to a decent existence and to
social security. A law shall provide for the protection of the workers, assistance to
the poor and for a system of social insurance.’
Nonetheless, the content and scope of the preceding provision is rather
idiosyncratic and speciﬁcally relevant to the Cypriot context, even if a parallel can
perhaps be found in the German Basic Law and the fundamental principle of the
‘social state’. It would however be difﬁcult to establish the universality of the
principle to the required extent that would qualify it as forming part of the common
constitutional traditions. The same could apply in relation to various other national
constitutional principles to be found in other jurisdictions. The issue can also be
assessed through the perspective and the experience of the ECHR on margin of
appreciation and European common ground. The key factor is the progression of
time and the maturing of a legal principle that is reflected in the growing acceptance
and adoption by the majority of the participating legal orders. In practical terms, the
highlighting of the centrality of a legal system in the national constitutional order
can be useful especially in the context of the preliminary reference procedure.
2.11 Article 53 of the Charter and the Issue of Stricter
Constitutional Standards
2.11.1 The Cypriot constitutional system places considerable emphasis on the
protection of fundamental rights and on the continuation of a fruitful relationship
between the national Constitution and the ECHR. This relationship has been very
close and can be characterised as an example of harmonious coexistence. The EU
dimension of the matter creates de facto and de jure a legal triangle that governs the
applicable standard of protection, but in the Cypriot context the issue has never
been discussed fully. The prevailing approach, as can be seen in relation to the Data
Retention Directive in Sect. 2.4, tends to isolate the EU aspect at least to the point
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where it resolves any clash with the national standards of protection in favour of the
EU standard. Methodologically this is achieved by ‘nationalising’ the issue and by
subsequently modifying the national standard; this is an unfortunate and prob-
lematic approach and outcome. Some cases where the Cypriot Constitution and the
Supreme Court provide a higher standard of protection than the ECHR were noted
in Sects. 1.1.2 and 2.1. Additionally, it will be recalled from Sect. 2.7.3 that Judge
Erotokritou in a dissenting opinion has expressed concern about the ‘erosion of
fundamental rights’ ‘often through informal procedures’.
At the general level, the constitutional triangle of protection must be ‘isosceles’.
That would reflect the equality of the legal orders, which is a fundamental pre-
requisite for the symbiosis of legal orders. This argument is reinforced by two
considerations. First, the respect for the constitutional identity of each system and
secondly, because of the forthcoming accession of the EU to the ECHR system. As
a result, the upwards modiﬁcation of the EU standard that would favour the pro-
tection afforded to a fundamental right must be encouraged, as it will be con-
structive for both the right in question and for the relationship with national courts.
The concept of deference is therefore to be reinforced, and the CJEU has shown
such willingness in the Omega case.193
2.12 Democratic Debate on Constitutional Rights
and Values
2.12.1–2.12.3 In relation to the democratic element as expressed through the par-
ticipation in open discussions about EU measures bound to have a substantial
impact on national constitutional values, it can be safely argued that in Cyprus no
such deliberations took place at any stage in relation to the EAW or the Data
Retention Directive. Moreover, when problems arose in those areas, the Supreme
Court indirectly facilitated the opening of a democratic dialogue by requiring the
introduction of constitutional amendments. This had the effect of creating a new
opportunity for the legislature to discuss in full such matters before proceeding with
the constitutional amendments, but the character of that discussion has remained the
responsibility of the legislature and the executive. Normally in such situations the
legislature invites professional bodies and experts to express their opinions, but
such discussion is not conducted at the national level and the public remains largely
disassociated. The matter is indeed important given the standing restrictions in
relation to an action for annulment of an EU act and it also touches upon the
legitimacy of the EU system. However, the fact that Member States through their
elective representatives participate in the adoption and implementation of such EU
acts cannot be ignored. The responsibility remains at the national level, and the
creation of a speciﬁc procedure could be beneﬁcial in terms of legitimacy, but it is
193 Case C-36/02 Omega [2004] ECR I-09609. For analysis, see Kombos 2006.
The Cypriot Constitution Under the Impact of EU Law … 1425
questionable whether it could be effective and efﬁcient. One such procedural route
could be the assessment of legality prior to the entry into force of the EU act, at both
the national and EU level. This, however, has to be assessed in relation to the
privileged standing status of Member States and to the efﬁciency of the EU system.
Moreover, issues of national procedural autonomy also arise and there is the
potential of national constitutional courts engaging in the review of validity of EU
acts in the making that would trigger the preliminary reference obligation for
national courts of last resort. The other suggested option, recognising the fact that
unconstitutionality has been identiﬁed in accordance with the domestic system of
control of constitutionality as a defence for the Member State in an infringement
proceeding, is problematic. This would occur at a later stage of the entry into force
of the EU measure and would create differing levels of compliance for Member
States, thus affecting the effectiveness of EU law.
2.13 Experts’ Analysis on the Protection of Constitutional
Rights in EU Law
2.13.1–2.13.2 The symbiosis of the different standards of protection is proving
problematic, but it is submitted that this has been the situation for decades, as the
experience with the Solange jurisprudence194 clearly indicates. The matter is
nonetheless bound to come to the forefront of the discussion with the accession of
the EU to the ECHR system, and it is perhaps crucial to assess the method and rules
of accession especially after the recent approach of the CJEU in Opinion 2/2013.195
This author acted as co-agent for Cyprus in those proceedings, and it can be argued
that the concerns of the CJEU about the relationship between the two systems and
the two Courts were evident in both the questionnaire sent to the intervening parties
and in the questions that the CJEU raised during the oral stage of the proceedings.
To summarise, the concerns about the different standards of protection are legit-
imate but are not new; they form part of the history of the constitutional coexistence.
2.13.3 As regards the quality of the reasoning of the CJEU in cases concerning
constitutional sensitivities, it is submitted that unfortunately the Cypriot Supreme
Court has so far not raised such concerns or issues for that matter. The limited
number of preliminary references submitted by Cypriot courts have concerned
speciﬁc issues that did not relate to deep constitutional concerns.
In terms of the broader issue, it can be argued that the key is in the formulation
of the preliminary reference by the national courts. The detailed statement of the
national perception and of the relevant applicable jurisprudence can hopefully steer
the approach of the CJEU towards a more detailed reasoning. Such examples, albeit
194 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfurh- und Vorratstelle für Getreide und
Futtermittel [1974] 2 CMLR 540; Wünsche Handelsgesellschaft (Solange II) [1987] 3 CMLR 225.
195 Opinion 2/13 Opinion pursuant to Art. 218(11) TFEU [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454.
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with varying success, can be found in the preliminary references in Digital Rights
Ireland and Seitlinger and Others and in Outright Monetary Transactions
(OMT).196 Moreover, the introduction of dissenting judgments would be beneﬁcial
for the clarity and completeness of the stated judicial reasoning, but there are strong
informal signs that the CJEU is ﬁrmly against any such reform.
2.13.4 In the Cypriot context there is an urgent need to re-establish the boundaries
between national constitutional law and EU law because the Fifth Constitutional
Amendment and the approach of the Supreme Court have created a tight and
restricted topos for airing national concerns about the shaping and upholding of
constitutional rights and principles.
3 Constitutional Issues in Global Governance
3.1–3.2 Constitutional Rules on International Organisations
and the Ratiﬁcation and Application of Treaties
The ratiﬁcation of treaties in Cyprus197 and the transfer of powers to international
organisations need to be considered within the framework of the status of the Republic
of Cyprus in public international law and the rigid nature of its Constitution, as already
analysed in detail in Sect. 1.1. One of the peculiar implications for the Republic of
Cyprus deriving from its unique constitutional setting relates to its membership in
international organisations. It should be noted that almost from the date of its creation
up to its accession to the EU (1961–2004), the Republic of Cyprus was a member of
the non-aligned movement. Cyprus is also the only EU Member State that is not a
member of NATO or of the Partnership for Peace Programme.198 The relationship the
Republic maintains with international organisations must of course be examined in the
light of the de facto division of its territory and in view of the several attempts
(including currently ongoing) to ﬁnd a solution to the Cyprus problem.
The Council of Ministers has the power to conclude any international agreement
by virtue of Arts. 50 and 54 of the Constitution. There is a difference between
international agreements concluded with a foreign state or an international organ-
isation falling under the scope of Art. 169(1) of the Constitution and relating to
‘commercial matters, economic co-operation and motus vivendi’, which are con-
cluded under a decision of the Council of Ministers, and any other treaty,
196 See respectively Joined cases C-293/12 and 594/12, n. 152; Case C-62/14 Gauweiler and
Others [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:400.
197 For a legal analysis of the reception of international legal agreements in the Cypriot national
legal order, see Laulhé Shaelou 2010b, pp. 471–484; see also Laulhé Shaelou 2010a, pp. 130–140.
198 Emilianides reports that ‘a decision of the House of Representatives that the Republic should
apply for membership in the Partnership for Peace programme was vetoed by the President of the
Republic Demetris Christoﬁas on 2 March 2011’, Emilianides 2013, p. 20.
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convention or international agreement falling under Art. 169(2) of the Constitution
which requires such international agreements to be ‘negotiated and signed under a
decision of the Council of Ministers’ but will ‘only be operative and binding on the
Republic when approved by a law made by the House of Representatives where-
upon it shall be concluded’. In accordance with Art. 169(3) of the Constitution, all
such treaties, conventions and agreements have, ‘as from their publication in the
ofﬁcial Gazette of the Republic, superior force to any municipal law on condition
that such treaties, conventions and agreements are applied by the other party
thereto’.199 Article 170(1) of the Constitution further provides that the Republic of
Cyprus ‘shall, by agreement on appropriate terms, accord most-favoured-nation
treatment to the Kingdom of Greece, the Republic of Turkey and the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for all agreements whatever their
nature might be’. The Treaty of Guarantee also provides in its Art. I that the
Republic of Cyprus undertakes to ensure the maintenance of its independence, territorial
integrity and security, as well as respect for its Constitution and undertakes not to partic-
ipate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any State whatsoever. It
accordingly declares prohibited any activity likely to promote, directly or indirectly, either
union with any other State or partition of the Island.
These provisions of the constitutional framework of the Republic of Cyprus
were at the centre of legal debates prior to Cyprus joining the EU. A group of
international legal experts concluded that none of these provisions were an obstacle
to Cyprus’ EU membership.200
3.3–3.5 Democratic Control, Judicial Review and the Social
Welfare Dimension
As for democratic control by the House of Representatives, it was already noted that
most of the time democratic deliberations are non-existent or limited. The
Constitution of Cyprus is, however, based on the principle of representative
democracy.201 Democratic debates within the House of Representatives take place
on a regular basis but not systematically (referendums can take place upon a
decision of the House of Representatives following a proposal from the Council of
Ministers as per the Referendum Law No 286/1989, but are kept for issues of
special importance and of public interest).202 It was noted for example in the
context of the run-up towards Cyprus’ EU accession that there was very little or no
199 The role of the Supreme Court with respect in particular to the ECHR has already been
developed in this Report.
200 Emilianides 2013, p. 212. For a pre-accession consideration of other debates surrounding the
impact of Cyprus’ EU membership on the Constitution, including with respect to conflict of
powers and transfer of powers, see Laulhé Shaelou 2010a, pp. 133–134.
201 For a detailed description and analysis of the system of government in Cyprus including
political parties and their role in the House of Representatives as interpreted recently by the
Supreme Court, see Emilianides 2013, pp. 65–75.
202 For a review of the Referendum Law, see Emilianides 2013, pp. 75–76.
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democratic debate taking place in the Parliament, as Cyprus’s strategy was mainly
based on external considerations and concerns.203
More recently, however, mention should be made of the more active role cur-
rently played by the House of Representatives in the context of the EU/IMF
macro-economic adjustment programme for Cyprus204 and of its pivotal role during
the negotiations leading to the programme.205
The lack of judicial activism in respect of the same matter has been noted
elsewhere in this Report.206
3.6 Constitutional Rights and Values in Selected Areas of
Global Governance
3.6.1 The constitutional amendment regarding extradition under international/
European arrangements was discussed in the introduction to Sect. 2.3.
The question of what safeguards are available to avoid potentially arbitrary
results in the context of an international arrest warrant arose in the case against Mr.
Louka, requested by South Africa, signatory to the European Convention on
Extradition since 2003, in George Louka v. Minister of Justice and Public Order.207
In the ﬁrst decision, the Supreme Court had to review the (alleged) administrative
decision of the Minister to sign the international arrest warrant issued against Mr.
Louka. The lower court had considered the discretionary powers of the Minister to
sign the said warrant as an ‘acte de gouvernement’, which meant that it fell beyond
the scope of the Court’s powers of review of administrative acts under Art. 146 of
the Constitution. The recourse before the Supreme Court was therefore rejected. In
the second decision, the Supreme Court ruled in ﬁnal instance on the request for the
issue of an order in the form of habeas corpus, as part of the prerogative orders
under Art. 155(4) of the Constitution whereby the Court has the exclusive juris-
diction to review the action of a lower court, in order to determine the lawfulness of
203 Laulhé Shaelou 2010a, p. 42.
204 With respect for example to the legal framework regarding non-performing loans and the
protection of the dwelling house.
205 See Sect. 2.7.3 and Laulhé Shaelou 2013.
206 See Sect. 2.7.3 for case law related to the bail-in and Sect. 2.2 for the austerity measures put in
place in Cyprus as a result of the ﬁnancial crisis. On 16 March 2013, a ﬁrst political agreement was
reached between the Eurogroup, IMF and the Cypriot authorities which included a one-off stability
levy for all resident and non-resident depositors, both insured and uninsured. This political
agreement was rejected by the House of Representatives on 19 March 2013. On 25 March 2013, a
second political agreement was reached between the Eurogroup and the Cypriot authorities,
supported by all euro area Member States and the international lenders on the policy Programme
and the loan package associated with it (10bn EUR in total). The political agreement included inter
alia bail-in measures for unsecured deposits in the two main Cypriot commercial banks and a
resolution programme. The Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the Cypriot
authorities, IMF and the European Commission on 26 April 2013. On 30 April 2013, the
Programme was endorsed by the House of Representatives.
207 Case 5965/2013, 16 October 2013 and Case 124/2013, 8 January 2014.
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the authority to detain a person–in this case Mr. Louka.208 Not surprisingly, the
Court decided that in the case of international arrest warrants to be executed under
the relevant law in Cyprus,209 the ultimate decision remains with the Minister who
can exercise his discretion to sign the warrant. The Court characterised this dis-
cretionary power as ‘political’ and ‘executive’ in nature, intimately linked to the
country’s international obligations, thereby falling beyond the scope of judicial
control which it found had been effectively exhausted in this case, including with
respect to the protection of fundamental human rights and in terms of access to
justice. Finally, the Court noted that both the courts and the Minister examine the
same criteria and therefore the scope of the examination ought to be different,
taking a ‘political dimension’ in the case of the examination by the latter. It is
hardly of any comfort to know that the judicial decision on the extradition of a
person may ultimately be subject to political considerations independently of the
judicial process accompanying the execution of the warrant. Given the role of the
Ministry and the Attorney General in the issue/execution of arrest warrants, one is
entitled to wonder what safeguards are available in the law to avoid potentially
arbitrary results.
In general, in view of the characteristics of the Constitution as developed in this
Report, many of them unique, and the lack of prospects for constitutional
improvements pending a solution to the Cyprus problem,210 it is debatable to what
extent Cyprus is equipped to face a process of globalised constitutional governance.
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